55 ideas
| 7278 | Words of wisdom are precise and clear [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7281 | Don't even start, let's just stay put [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7282 | Disagreement means you do not understand at all [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7284 | If you beat me in argument, does that mean you are right? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7289 | Do not try to do things, or to master knowledge; just be empty [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
| 23403 | You know you were dreaming when you wake, but there might then be a greater awakening from that [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7285 | Did Chuang Tzu dream he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dream he was Chuang Tzu? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
| 5960 | When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch] |
| 7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
| 7873 | Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau] |
| 7874 | Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau] |
| 7882 | Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau] |
| 7854 | Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau] |
| 7889 | Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau] |
| 7891 | We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau] |
| 7890 | Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau] |
| 7885 | The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau] |
| 7886 | Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau] |
| 7887 | States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau] |
| 7888 | Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau] |
| 7277 | The perfect man has no self [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7286 | To see with true clarity, your self must be irrelevant [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
| 7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
| 7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
| 7858 | If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau] |
| 7865 | Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau] |
| 7892 | The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau] |
| 7879 | Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau] |
| 20971 | Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau] |
| 7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
| 7881 | Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau] |
| 7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
| 7850 | Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau] |
| 7851 | Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau] |
| 7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
| 7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
| 7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
| 7279 | If words can't be defined, they may just be the chirruping of chicks [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
| 7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
| 7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
| 23404 | Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7283 | Great courage is not violent [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
| 7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
| 20976 | The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau] |
| 20974 | Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau] |
| 20970 | Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau] |
| 20975 | Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau] |
| 7280 | As all life is one, what need is there for words? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7288 | Go with the flow, and be one with the void of Heaven [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| 7287 | Fish forget about each other in the pond and forget each other in the Tao [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |