15 ideas
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
22687 | Maybe literary assessment is evaluating the artist as a suitable friend [Gaut] |
22686 | Formalists say aesthetics concerns types of beauty, or unity, complexity and intensity [Gaut] |
22690 | 'Moralism' says all aesthetic merits are moral merits [Gaut] |
22684 | Good ethics counts towards aesthetic merit, and bad ethics counts against it [Gaut] |
22689 | If we don't respond ethically in the way a work prescribes, that is an aesthetic failure [Gaut] |
22685 | Good art does not necessarily improve people (any more than good advice does) [Gaut] |