Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'Grounding: an opinionated introduction' and 'Mr Strawson on Logical Theory'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
17266 Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22438 Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
22436 Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
17263 Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
22431 Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
22435 The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
22433 It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
22437 Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
22434 Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
17270 Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17268 Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
17267 The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
15034 Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
22432 Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
22430 If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
13713 Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider]