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All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' and 'Writings from Late Notebooks'

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124 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
'Wisdom' attempts to get beyond perspectives, making it hostile to life [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Words such as 'I' and 'do' and 'done to' are placed at the point where our ignorance begins [Nietzsche]
Pessimism is laughable, because the world cannot be evaluated [Nietzsche]
Is a 'philosopher' now impossible, because knowledge is too vast for an overview? [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Philosophers should create and fight for their concepts, not just clean and clarify them [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic tries to understand the world according to a man-made scheme [Nietzsche]
Logic is not driven by truth, but desire for a simple single viewpoint [Nietzsche]
Logic must falsely assume that identical cases exist [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
We can't be realists, because we don't know what being is [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Categories are not metaphysical truths, but inventions in the service of needs [Nietzsche]
Philosophers find it particularly hard to shake off belief in necessary categories [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Maybe there are only subjects, and 'objects' result from relations between subjects [Nietzsche]
Counting needs unities, but that doesn't mean they exist; we borrowed it from the concept of 'I' [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
The essence of a thing is only an opinion about the 'thing' [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Something can be irrefutable; that doesn't make it true [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
There are no necessary truths, but something must be held to be true [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
We can't use our own self to criticise our own capacity for knowledge! [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe]
Belief in the body is better established than belief in the mind [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe]
Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe]
Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Pain shows the value of the damage, not what has been damaged [Nietzsche]
Perception is unconscious, and we are only conscious of processed perceptions [Nietzsche]
Sense perceptions contain values (useful, so pleasant) [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe]
If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Comprehending everything is impossible, because it abolishes perspectives [Nietzsche]
Is the perspectival part of the essence, or just a relation between beings? [Nietzsche]
'Perspectivism': the world has no meaning, but various interpretations give it countless meanings [Nietzsche]
'Subjectivity' is an interpretation, since subjects (and interpreters) are fictions [Nietzsche]
There are different eyes, so different 'truths', so there is no truth [Nietzsche]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is just showing the succession of things ever more clearly [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The intellect and senses are a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
With protoplasm ½+½=2, so the soul is not an indivisible monad [Nietzsche]
Unity is not in the conscious 'I', but in the organism, which uses the self as a tool [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Consciousness exists to the extent that consciousness is useful [Nietzsche]
Consciousness is a 'tool' - just as the stomach is a tool [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain
If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe]
We think each thought causes the next, unaware of the hidden struggle beneath [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The 'I' is a conceptual synthesis, not the governor of our being [Nietzsche]
The 'I' is a fiction used to make the world of becoming 'knowable' [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
'Freedom of will' is the feeling of having a dominating force [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe]
Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe]
Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality is a scheme we cannot cast away [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe]
People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe]
Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
There is no will; weakness of will is splitting of impulses, strong will is coordination under one impulse [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Experiencing a thing as beautiful is to experience it wrongly [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality is a system of values which accompanies a being's life [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Morality is merely interpretations, which are extra-moral in origin [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Values are innate and inherited [Nietzsche]
Our values express an earlier era's conditions for survival and growth [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
Knowledge, wisdom and goodness only have value relative to a goal [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Altruism is praised by the egoism of the weak, who want everyone to be looked after [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
A living being is totally 'egoistic' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Modest people express happiness as 'Not bad' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The only happiness is happiness with illusion [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure needs dissatisfaction, boundaries and resistances [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue is wasteful, as it reduces us all to being one another's nurse [Nietzsche]
Virtue for everyone removes its charm of being exceptional and aristocratic [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
What does not kill us makes us stronger [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Courage, compassion, insight, solitude are the virtues, with courtesy a necessary vice [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Replace the categorical imperative by the natural imperative [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Not feeling harnessed to a system of 'ends' is a wonderful feeling of freedom [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Nihilism results from measuring the world by our categories which are purely invented [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
By developing herd virtues man fixes what has up to now been the 'unfixed animal' [Nietzsche]
Virtues from outside are dangerous, and they should come from within [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Existence without meaning or goal or end, eternally recurring, is a terrible thought [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is above all a judging animal [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
The upholding of the military state is needed to maintain the strong human type [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights arise out of contracts, which need a balance of power [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
'Purpose' is like the sun, where most heat is wasted, and a tiny part has 'purpose' [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
If the world aimed at an end, it would have reached it by now [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Things are strong or weak, and do not behave regularly or according to rules or compulsions [Nietzsche]
Chemical 'laws' are merely the establishment of power relations between weaker and stronger [Nietzsche]
All motions and 'laws' are symptoms of inner events, traceable to the will to power [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
The utility of an organ does not explain its origin, on the contrary! [Nietzsche]
Survival might undermine an individual's value, or prevent its evolution [Nietzsche]
Darwin overestimates the influence of 'external circumstances' [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Remove goodness and wisdom from our concept of God. Being the highest power is enough! [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Morality kills religion, because a Christian-moral God is unbelievable [Nietzsche]
It is dishonest to invent a being containing our greatest values, thus ignoring why they exist and are valuable [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Morality can only be upheld by belief in God and a 'hereafter' [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Paganism is a form of thanking and affirming life? [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christian belief is kept alive because it is soothing - the proof based on pleasure [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
In heaven all the interesting men are missing [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
A combination of great power and goodness would mean the disastrous abolition of evil [Nietzsche]