Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'Letter to Herodotus' and 'What Required for Foundation for Maths?'

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57 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions make our intuitions mathematically useful [Mayberry]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Proof shows that it is true, but also why it must be true [Mayberry]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
There is a semi-categorical axiomatisation of set-theory [Mayberry]
Set theory can't be axiomatic, because it is needed to express the very notion of axiomatisation [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
The misnamed Axiom of Infinity says the natural numbers are finite in size [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The set hierarchy doesn't rely on the dubious notion of 'generating' them [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of size is part of the very conception of a set [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
The mainstream of modern logic sees it as a branch of mathematics [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic only has its main theorems because it is so weak [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Only second-order logic can capture mathematical structure up to isomorphism [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Big logic has one fixed domain, but standard logic has a domain for each interpretation [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
No Löwenheim-Skolem logic can axiomatise real analysis [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
'Classificatory' axioms aim at revealing similarity in morphology of structures [Mayberry]
Axiomatiation relies on isomorphic structures being essentially the same [Mayberry]
'Eliminatory' axioms get rid of traditional ideal and abstract objects [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
No logic which can axiomatise arithmetic can be compact or complete [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers can be eliminated, by axiom systems for complete ordered fields [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / b. Quantity
Greek quantities were concrete, and ratio and proportion were their science [Mayberry]
Real numbers were invented, as objects, to simplify and generalise 'quantity' [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Cantor's infinite is an absolute, of all the sets or all the ordinal numbers [Mayberry]
Cantor extended the finite (rather than 'taming the infinite') [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
If proof and definition are central, then mathematics needs and possesses foundations [Mayberry]
The ultimate principles and concepts of mathematics are presumed, or grasped directly [Mayberry]
Foundations need concepts, definition rules, premises, and proof rules [Mayberry]
Axiom theories can't give foundations for mathematics - that's using axioms to explain axioms [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
1st-order PA is only interesting because of results which use 2nd-order PA [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
It is only 2nd-order isomorphism which suggested first-order PA completeness [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set theory is not just first-order ZF, because that is inadequate for mathematics [Mayberry]
We don't translate mathematics into set theory, because it comes embodied in that way [Mayberry]
Set theory is not just another axiomatised part of mathematics [Mayberry]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Nothing comes to be from what doesn't exist [Epicurus]
If disappearing things went to nothingness, nothing could return, and it would all be gone by now [Epicurus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
The totality is complete, so there is no room for it to change, and nothing extraneous to change it [Epicurus]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus]
Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Real numbers as abstracted objects are now treated as complete ordered fields [Mayberry]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Atoms only have shape, weight and size, and the properties which accompany shape [Epicurus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Illusions are not false perceptions, as we accurately perceive the pattern of atoms [Epicurus, by Modrak]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
The soul is fine parts distributed through the body, resembling hot breath [Epicurus]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Totality has no edge; an edge implies a contrast beyond the edge, and there can't be one [Epicurus]
Bodies are unlimited as well as void, since the two necessarily go together [Epicurus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
There exists an infinity of each shape of atom, but the number of shapes is beyond our knowledge [Epicurus]
Atoms just have shape, size and weight; colour results from their arrangement [Epicurus]
There cannot be unlimited division, because it would reduce things to non-existence [Epicurus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Space must exist, since movement is obvious, and there must be somewhere to move in [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
There are endless cosmoi, some like and some unlike this one [Epicurus]