Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'Function and Concept' and 'The Meaning of 'Meaning''

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE]
Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]