Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic' and 'Davidson on himself'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
3972 Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
3969 There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14626 In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent [Williamson]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
15034 Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
14625 Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
14623 Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
14624 Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14531 Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
3960 There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
14628 Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals [Williamson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3964 If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
3961 Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
3963 There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
3965 Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3966 The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
3967 Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3974 Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
3968 Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
3970 Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
3971 There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
3973 Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
3962 Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]