Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'Plato on Parts and Wholes' and 'Locke on Human Understanding'

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15 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V]
If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V]
The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]