36 ideas
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
9570 | In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara] |
10260 | Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
8958 | In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó] |
18221 | 'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H] |
8757 | The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H] |
18212 | Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H] |
10261 | The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
18218 | Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H] |
9623 | Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H] |
18215 | It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H] |
18216 | Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H] |
18214 | Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H] |
18210 | Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H] |
18211 | You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
8959 | Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó] |
18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
18222 | Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
9917 | 'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
18223 | In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H] |
18220 | Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H] |
18219 | Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |