Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Theory of Objects' and 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion'

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15 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9161 Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
8250 So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
8719 There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
8971 There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong]
8718 Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
7756 Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]
15781 The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
9165 Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
9162 Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
9166 People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
13304 Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
20820 Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]