44 ideas
| 11051 | Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna] |
| 11054 | Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna] |
| 11070 | 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna] |
| 11071 | 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna] |
| 11088 | We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna] |
| 11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna] |
| 11089 | Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna] |
| 11058 | Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna] |
| 11072 | Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna] |
| 11061 | Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna] |
| 11063 | Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna] |
| 11055 | Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna] |
| 14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
| 14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
| 14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
| 14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
| 14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
| 14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
| 14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
| 14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
| 14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
| 14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
| 11083 | A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna] |
| 11086 | Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna] |
| 11084 | Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna] |
| 11085 | Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna] |
| 14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
| 14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
| 14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
| 11077 | Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna] |
| 11080 | Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna] |
| 11078 | Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna] |
| 11053 | Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna] |
| 11081 | Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna] |
| 11082 | Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna] |
| 11068 | One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna] |
| 11047 | Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna] |
| 11048 | Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna] |
| 11046 | Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna] |
| 11067 | Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna] |
| 11045 | Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna] |
| 14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |