Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Contingent Identity' and 'The Nature of Rationality'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick]
Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick]
Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick]
Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]