Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Nicomachean Ethics' and 'Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations)'

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405 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious [Aristotle]
Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel on Aristotle]
Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object [Frege]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Frege was the first to give linguistic answers to non-linguistic questions [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege initiated linguistic philosophy, studying number through the sense of sentences [Frege, by Dummett]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Frege developed formal systems to avoid unnoticed assumptions [Frege, by Lavine]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege]
Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Originally Frege liked contextual definitions, but later preferred them fully explicit [Frege, by Dummett]
Nothing should be defined in terms of that to which it is conceptually prior [Frege, by Dummett]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Proof aims to remove doubts, but also to show the interdependence of truths [Frege]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
You can't transfer external properties unchanged to apply to ideas [Frege]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Frege agreed with Euclid that the axioms of logic and mathematics are known through self-evidence [Frege, by Burge]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null set is only defensible if it is the extension of an empty concept [Frege, by Burge]
It is because a concept can be empty that there is such a thing as the empty class [Frege, by Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
We can introduce new objects, as equivalence classes of objects already known [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege introduced the standard device, of defining logical objects with equivalence classes [Frege, by Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Frege, unlike Russell, has infinite individuals because numbers are individuals [Frege, by Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
A class is, for Frege, the extension of a concept [Frege, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Convert "Jupiter has four moons" into "the number of Jupiter's moons is four" [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
Despite Gödel, Frege's epistemic ordering of all the truths is still plausible [Frege, by Burge]
The primitive simples of arithmetic are the essence, determining the subject, and its boundaries [Frege, by Jeshion]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Each horse doesn't fall under the concept 'horse that draws the carriage', because all four are needed [Oliver/Smiley on Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
We can show that a concept is consistent by producing something which falls under it [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
To understand axioms you must grasp their logical power and priority [Frege, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
We cannot define numbers from the idea of a series, because numbers must precede that [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
Treating 0 as a number avoids antinomies involving treating 'nobody' as a person [Frege, by Dummett]
For Frege 'concept' and 'extension' are primitive, but 'zero' and 'successor' are defined [Frege, by Chihara]
If objects exist because they fall under a concept, 0 is the object under which no objects fall [Frege, by Dummett]
Nought is the number belonging to the concept 'not identical with itself' [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
We can say 'a and b are F' if F is 'wise', but not if it is 'one' [Frege]
One is the Number which belongs to the concept "identical with 0" [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
You can abstract concepts from the moon, but the number one is not among them [Frege]
Units can be equal without being identical [Tait on Frege]
Frege says only concepts which isolate and avoid arbitrary division can give units [Frege, by Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries [Frege, by Koslicki]
Non-arbitrary division means that what falls under the concept cannot be divided into more of the same [Frege, by Koslicki]
Our concepts decide what is countable, as in seeing the leaves of the tree, or the foliage [Frege, by Koslicki]
A concept creating a unit must isolate and unify what falls under it [Frege]
Frege says counting is determining what number belongs to a given concept [Frege, by Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
Frege's one-to-one correspondence replaces well-ordering, because infinities can't be counted [Frege, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
The number of natural numbers is not a natural number [Frege, by George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Arithmetical statements can't be axioms, because they are provable [Frege, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
A statement of number contains a predication about a concept [Frege]
Frege's problem is explaining the particularity of numbers by general laws [Frege, by Burge]
Individual numbers are best derived from the number one, and increase by one [Frege]
'Exactly ten gallons' may not mean ten things instantiate 'gallon' [Rumfitt on Frege]
Numerical statements have first-order logical form, so must refer to objects [Frege, by Hodes]
The Number for F is the extension of 'equal to F' (or maybe just F itself) [Frege]
Numbers are objects because they partake in identity statements [Frege, by Bostock]
Frege had a motive to treat numbers as objects, but not a justification [Hale/Wright on Frege]
Frege claims that numbers are objects, as opposed to them being Fregean concepts [Frege, by Wright,C]
Numbers are second-level, ascribing properties to concepts rather than to objects [Frege, by Wright,C]
For Frege, successor was a relation, not a function [Frege, by Dummett]
Numbers are more than just 'second-level concepts', since existence is also one [Frege, by George/Velleman]
"Number of x's such that ..x.." is a functional expression, yielding a name when completed [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Frege gives an incoherent account of extensions resulting from abstraction [Fine,K on Frege]
For Frege the number of F's is a collection of first-level concepts [Frege, by George/Velleman]
A cardinal number may be defined as a class of similar classes [Frege, by Russell]
Numbers need to be objects, to define the extension of the concept of each successor to n [Frege, by George/Velleman]
The number of F's is the extension of the second level concept 'is equipollent with F' [Frege, by Tait]
Frege showed that numbers attach to concepts, not to objects [Frege, by Wiggins]
Frege replaced Cantor's sets as the objects of equinumerosity attributions with concepts [Frege, by Tait]
Zero is defined using 'is not self-identical', and one by using the concept of zero [Frege, by Weiner]
Frege said logical predication implies classes, which are arithmetical objects [Frege, by Morris,M]
Frege started with contextual definition, but then switched to explicit extensional definition [Frege, by Wright,C]
Each number, except 0, is the number of the concept of all of its predecessors [Frege, by Wright,C]
Frege's account of cardinals fails in modern set theory, so they are now defined differently [Dummett on Frege]
Frege's incorrect view is that a number is an equivalence class [Benacerraf on Frege]
The natural number n is the set of n-membered sets [Frege, by Yourgrau]
A set doesn't have a fixed number, because the elements can be seen in different ways [Yourgrau on Frege]
If you can subdivide objects many ways for counting, you can do that to set-elements too [Yourgrau on Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS]
Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter]
Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
The words 'There are exactly Julius Caesar moons of Mars' are gibberish [Rumfitt on Frege]
'Julius Caesar' isn't a number because numbers inherit properties of 0 and successor [Frege, by George/Velleman]
From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number? [Frege, by Friend]
Frege said 2 is the extension of all pairs (so Julius Caesar isn't 2, because he's not an extension) [Frege, by Shapiro]
Fregean numbers are numbers, and not 'Caesar', because they correlate 1-1 [Frege, by Wright,C]
One-one correlations imply normal arithmetic, but don't explain our concept of a number [Frege, by Bostock]
Our definition will not tell us whether or not Julius Caesar is a number [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
If numbers can be derived from logic, then set theory is superfluous [Frege, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If numbers are supposed to be patterns, each number can have many patterns [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Numbers seem to be objects because they exactly fit the inference patterns for identities [Frege]
Frege's platonism proposes that objects are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Wright,C]
How can numbers be external (one pair of boots is two boots), or subjective (and so relative)? [Frege, by Weiner]
Identities refer to objects, so numbers must be objects [Frege, by Weiner]
Numbers are not physical, and not ideas - they are objective and non-sensible [Frege]
Numbers are objects, because they can take the definite article, and can't be plurals [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Frege's logicism aimed at removing the reliance of arithmetic on intuition [Frege, by Yourgrau]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
It appears that numbers are adjectives, but they don't apply to a single object [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Numerical adjectives are of the same second-level type as the existential quantifier [Frege, by George/Velleman]
'Jupiter has many moons' won't read as 'The number of Jupiter's moons equals the number many' [Rumfitt on Frege]
The number 'one' can't be a property, if any object can be viewed as one or not one [Frege]
For science, we can translate adjectival numbers into noun form [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is analytic [Frege, by Weiner]
Logicism shows that no empirical truths are needed to justify arithmetic [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Frege offered a Platonist version of logicism, committed to cardinal and real numbers [Frege, by Hale/Wright]
Mathematics has no special axioms of its own, but follows from principles of logic (with definitions) [Frege, by Bostock]
Arithmetic must be based on logic, because of its total generality [Frege, by Jeshion]
Numbers are definable in terms of mapping items which fall under concepts [Frege, by Scruton]
Arithmetic is analytic and a priori, and thus it is part of logic [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Frege only managed to prove that arithmetic was analytic with a logic that included set-theory [Quine on Frege]
Frege's platonism and logicism are in conflict, if logic must dictates an infinity of objects [Wright,C on Frege]
Why should the existence of pure logic entail the existence of objects? [George/Velleman on Frege]
Frege's belief in logicism and in numerical objects seem uncomfortable together [Hodes on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism fails to recognise types of symbols, and also meta-games [Frege, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Frege was completing Bolzano's work, of expelling intuition from number theory and analysis [Frege, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
Abstraction from things produces concepts, and numbers are in the concepts [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / e. Psychologism
Mental states are irrelevant to mathematics, because they are vague and fluctuating [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege]
The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege]
Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
'Ancestral' relations are derived by iterating back from a given relation [Frege, by George/Velleman]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle]
It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle]
How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Not all objects are spatial; 4 can still be an object, despite lacking spatial co-ordinates [Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Frege says singular terms denote objects, numerals are singular terms, so numbers exist [Frege, by Hale]
Frege establishes abstract objects independently from concrete ones, by falling under a concept [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright]
Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Frege's universe comes already divided into objects [Frege, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan]
Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
To understand a thought you must understand its logical structure [Frege, by Burge]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege]
A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle]
If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle]
Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
Justifications show the ordering of truths, and the foundation is what is self-evident [Frege, by Jeshion]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is merely psychological, with a principle that it can actually establish laws [Frege]
In science one observation can create high probability, while a thousand might prove nothing [Frege]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Ideas are not spatial, and don't have distances between them [Frege]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle]
In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle]
The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle]
If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre]
For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle]
Thought is the same everywhere, and the laws of thought do not vary [Frege]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C]
A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner]
Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki]
Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
A concept is a possible predicate of a singular judgement [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Defining 'direction' by parallelism doesn't tell you whether direction is a line [Dummett on Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Frege accepts abstraction to the concept of all sets equipollent to a given one [Tait on Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Frege himself abstracts away from tone and color [Yablo on Frege]
If we abstract 'from' two cats, the units are not black or white, or cats [Tait on Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Frege's logical abstaction identifies a common feature as the maximal set of equivalent objects [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege's 'parallel' and 'direction' don't have the same content, as we grasp 'parallel' first [Yablo on Frege]
Frege put the idea of abstraction on a rigorous footing [Frege, by Fine,K]
Fregean abstraction creates concepts which are equivalences between initial items [Frege, by Fine,K]
We create new abstract concepts by carving up the content in a different way [Frege]
You can't simultaneously fix the truth-conditions of a sentence and the domain of its variables [Dummett on Frege]
From basing 'parallel' on identity of direction, Frege got all abstractions from identity statements [Frege, by Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege]
Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian]
Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle]
Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle]
Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham]
Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle]
A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle]
Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle]
Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle]
Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle]
One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle]
The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle]
Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle]
Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle]
Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle]
For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle]
For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle]
There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle]
We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle]
If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle]
To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle]
Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle]
How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle]
Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle]
Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle]
Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle]
Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle]
Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle]
For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle]
There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle]
The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle]
Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle]
The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle]
You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi]
Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle]
Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle]
Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle]
Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle]
If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle]
Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle]
The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle]
The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle]
Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle]
There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle]
Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle]
There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle]
It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle]
If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle]
While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle]
Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity [Aristotle]
A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue [Aristotle]
Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that [Aristotle]
Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman on Aristotle]
Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done [Aristotle]
If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions [Aristotle]
Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment [Aristotle]
Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown [Aristotle]
A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness [Aristotle]
There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action [Aristotle]
An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown [Aristotle]
People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral [Aristotle]
How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? [Aristotle]
If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg]
Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle]
We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / a. Natural virtue
We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle]
Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle]
Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine [Aristotle]
A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves [Aristotle]
Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle]
True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle]
Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle]
Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle]
We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle]
We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle]
Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant [Aristotle]
People develop their characters through the activities they pursue [Aristotle]
When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly [Aristotle]
It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument [Aristotle]
Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Aristotle, by Urmson]
The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas]
Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle]
Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle]
The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle]
Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle]
One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle]
In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle]
We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle]
The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle]
The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle]
To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle]
Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle]
The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle]
It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B on Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation [Aristotle]
Between friends there is no need for justice [Aristotle]
Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people [Aristotle]
What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson on Aristotle]
Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character [Aristotle]
Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death [Aristotle]
True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Honour is clearly the greatest external good [Aristotle]
If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Aristotle, by Williams,B]
Honour depends too much on the person who awards it [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man [Aristotle]
Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain [Aristotle]
The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life [Aristotle]
The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? [Aristotle]
Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate [Aristotle]
We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us [Aristotle]
The more people contemplate, the happier they are [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth [Aristotle]
A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless [Aristotle]
It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The virtue of generosity requires money [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil [Aristotle]
Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Man is by nature a social being [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible [Aristotle]
Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / b. Legislature
We hold that every piece of legislation is just [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice [Aristotle]
Friendship is based on a community of sharing [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Aristotle thought slavery is just if it is both necessary and natural [Aristotle, by Sandel]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Aristotle, by Sandel]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
To learn something, you must know that you don't know [Frege]
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin on Aristotle]
The nature of any given thing is determined by its end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
The laws of number are not laws of nature, but are laws of the laws of nature [Frege]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter]
Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
We all assume immortality is impossible [Aristotle]