405 ideas
78 | Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious [Aristotle] |
5248 | Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes [Aristotle] |
2682 | Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel on Aristotle] |
103 | Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps [Aristotle] |
112 | Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument [Aristotle] |
13876 | The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C] |
8415 | Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object [Frege] |
9841 | Frege was the first to give linguistic answers to non-linguistic questions [Frege, by Dummett] |
9840 | Frege initiated linguistic philosophy, studying number through the sense of sentences [Frege, by Dummett] |
15948 | Frege developed formal systems to avoid unnoticed assumptions [Frege, by Lavine] |
22 | Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle] |
76 | The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary [Aristotle] |
10804 | Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo] |
9832 | Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege] |
8414 | Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege] |
4333 | Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another [Aristotle] |
9844 | Originally Frege liked contextual definitions, but later preferred them fully explicit [Frege, by Dummett] |
9822 | Nothing should be defined in terms of that to which it is conceptually prior [Frege, by Dummett] |
17495 | Proof aims to remove doubts, but also to show the interdependence of truths [Frege] |
8632 | You can't transfer external properties unchanged to apply to ideas [Frege] |
21356 | Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends [Aristotle] |
13881 | We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C] |
35 | A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it [Aristotle] |
9154 | Frege agreed with Euclid that the axioms of logic and mathematics are known through self-evidence [Frege, by Burge] |
9157 | The null set is only defensible if it is the extension of an empty concept [Frege, by Burge] |
9835 | It is because a concept can be empty that there is such a thing as the empty class [Frege, by Dummett] |
9854 | We can introduce new objects, as equivalence classes of objects already known [Frege, by Dummett] |
9883 | Frege introduced the standard device, of defining logical objects with equivalence classes [Frege, by Dummett] |
18104 | Frege, unlike Russell, has infinite individuals because numbers are individuals [Frege, by Bostock] |
9834 | A class is, for Frege, the extension of a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
8645 | Convert "Jupiter has four moons" into "the number of Jupiter's moons is four" [Frege] |
16891 | Despite Gödel, Frege's epistemic ordering of all the truths is still plausible [Frege, by Burge] |
16906 | The primitive simples of arithmetic are the essence, determining the subject, and its boundaries [Frege, by Jeshion] |
14236 | Each horse doesn't fall under the concept 'horse that draws the carriage', because all four are needed [Oliver/Smiley on Frege] |
22294 | We can show that a concept is consistent by producing something which falls under it [Frege] |
17624 | To understand axioms you must grasp their logical power and priority [Frege, by Burge] |
8640 | We cannot define numbers from the idea of a series, because numbers must precede that [Frege] |
9838 | Treating 0 as a number avoids antinomies involving treating 'nobody' as a person [Frege, by Dummett] |
9564 | For Frege 'concept' and 'extension' are primitive, but 'zero' and 'successor' are defined [Frege, by Chihara] |
10551 | If objects exist because they fall under a concept, 0 is the object under which no objects fall [Frege, by Dummett] |
8653 | Nought is the number belonging to the concept 'not identical with itself' [Frege] |
8636 | We can say 'a and b are F' if F is 'wise', but not if it is 'one' [Frege] |
8654 | One is the Number which belongs to the concept "identical with 0" [Frege] |
8641 | You can abstract concepts from the moon, but the number one is not among them [Frege] |
9989 | Units can be equal without being identical [Tait on Frege] |
17429 | Frege says only concepts which isolate and avoid arbitrary division can give units [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17427 | Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17437 | Non-arbitrary division means that what falls under the concept cannot be divided into more of the same [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17438 | Our concepts decide what is countable, as in seeing the leaves of the tree, or the foliage [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17426 | A concept creating a unit must isolate and unify what falls under it [Frege] |
17428 | Frege says counting is determining what number belongs to a given concept [Frege, by Koslicki] |
15916 | Frege's one-to-one correspondence replaces well-ordering, because infinities can't be counted [Frege, by Lavine] |
10034 | The number of natural numbers is not a natural number [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
16883 | Arithmetical statements can't be axioms, because they are provable [Frege, by Burge] |
17460 | A statement of number contains a predication about a concept [Frege] |
16890 | Frege's problem is explaining the particularity of numbers by general laws [Frege, by Burge] |
8630 | Individual numbers are best derived from the number one, and increase by one [Frege] |
11029 | 'Exactly ten gallons' may not mean ten things instantiate 'gallon' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
10013 | Numerical statements have first-order logical form, so must refer to objects [Frege, by Hodes] |
18181 | The Number for F is the extension of 'equal to F' (or maybe just F itself) [Frege] |
18103 | Numbers are objects because they partake in identity statements [Frege, by Bostock] |
10625 | Frege had a motive to treat numbers as objects, but not a justification [Hale/Wright on Frege] |
13871 | Frege claims that numbers are objects, as opposed to them being Fregean concepts [Frege, by Wright,C] |
13872 | Numbers are second-level, ascribing properties to concepts rather than to objects [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9816 | For Frege, successor was a relation, not a function [Frege, by Dummett] |
9953 | Numbers are more than just 'second-level concepts', since existence is also one [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9954 | "Number of x's such that ..x.." is a functional expression, yielding a name when completed [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10139 | Frege gives an incoherent account of extensions resulting from abstraction [Fine,K on Frege] |
10028 | For Frege the number of F's is a collection of first-level concepts [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
17636 | A cardinal number may be defined as a class of similar classes [Frege, by Russell] |
10029 | Numbers need to be objects, to define the extension of the concept of each successor to n [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9973 | The number of F's is the extension of the second level concept 'is equipollent with F' [Frege, by Tait] |
16500 | Frege showed that numbers attach to concepts, not to objects [Frege, by Wiggins] |
9990 | Frege replaced Cantor's sets as the objects of equinumerosity attributions with concepts [Frege, by Tait] |
7738 | Zero is defined using 'is not self-identical', and one by using the concept of zero [Frege, by Weiner] |
23456 | Frege said logical predication implies classes, which are arithmetical objects [Frege, by Morris,M] |
13887 | Frege started with contextual definition, but then switched to explicit extensional definition [Frege, by Wright,C] |
13897 | Each number, except 0, is the number of the concept of all of its predecessors [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9856 | Frege's account of cardinals fails in modern set theory, so they are now defined differently [Dummett on Frege] |
9902 | Frege's incorrect view is that a number is an equivalence class [Benacerraf on Frege] |
17814 | The natural number n is the set of n-membered sets [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
17819 | A set doesn't have a fixed number, because the elements can be seen in different ways [Yourgrau on Frege] |
17820 | If you can subdivide objects many ways for counting, you can do that to set-elements too [Yourgrau on Frege] |
9956 | 'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
13527 | Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS] |
22292 | Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter] |
17442 | Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck] |
11030 | The words 'There are exactly Julius Caesar moons of Mars' are gibberish [Rumfitt on Frege] |
10030 | 'Julius Caesar' isn't a number because numbers inherit properties of 0 and successor [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
8690 | From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number? [Frege, by Friend] |
10219 | Frege said 2 is the extension of all pairs (so Julius Caesar isn't 2, because he's not an extension) [Frege, by Shapiro] |
13889 | Fregean numbers are numbers, and not 'Caesar', because they correlate 1-1 [Frege, by Wright,C] |
18142 | One-one correlations imply normal arithmetic, but don't explain our concept of a number [Frege, by Bostock] |
9046 | Our definition will not tell us whether or not Julius Caesar is a number [Frege] |
16896 | If numbers can be derived from logic, then set theory is superfluous [Frege, by Burge] |
8639 | If numbers are supposed to be patterns, each number can have many patterns [Frege] |
13874 | Numbers seem to be objects because they exactly fit the inference patterns for identities [Frege] |
13875 | Frege's platonism proposes that objects are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Wright,C] |
7731 | How can numbers be external (one pair of boots is two boots), or subjective (and so relative)? [Frege, by Weiner] |
7737 | Identities refer to objects, so numbers must be objects [Frege, by Weiner] |
8635 | Numbers are not physical, and not ideas - they are objective and non-sensible [Frege] |
8652 | Numbers are objects, because they can take the definite article, and can't be plurals [Frege] |
17816 | Frege's logicism aimed at removing the reliance of arithmetic on intuition [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
8633 | There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege] |
9951 | It appears that numbers are adjectives, but they don't apply to a single object [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9952 | Numerical adjectives are of the same second-level type as the existential quantifier [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
11031 | 'Jupiter has many moons' won't read as 'The number of Jupiter's moons equals the number many' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
8637 | The number 'one' can't be a property, if any object can be viewed as one or not one [Frege] |
9999 | For science, we can translate adjectival numbers into noun form [Frege] |
7739 | Arithmetic is analytic [Frege, by Weiner] |
9945 | Logicism shows that no empirical truths are needed to justify arithmetic [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
8782 | Frege offered a Platonist version of logicism, committed to cardinal and real numbers [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
13608 | Mathematics has no special axioms of its own, but follows from principles of logic (with definitions) [Frege, by Bostock] |
16905 | Arithmetic must be based on logic, because of its total generality [Frege, by Jeshion] |
5658 | Numbers are definable in terms of mapping items which fall under concepts [Frege, by Scruton] |
8655 | Arithmetic is analytic and a priori, and thus it is part of logic [Frege] |
10831 | Frege only managed to prove that arithmetic was analytic with a logic that included set-theory [Quine on Frege] |
13864 | Frege's platonism and logicism are in conflict, if logic must dictates an infinity of objects [Wright,C on Frege] |
10033 | Why should the existence of pure logic entail the existence of objects? [George/Velleman on Frege] |
10010 | Frege's belief in logicism and in numerical objects seem uncomfortable together [Hodes on Frege] |
9631 | Formalism fails to recognise types of symbols, and also meta-games [Frege, by Brown,JR] |
9875 | Frege was completing Bolzano's work, of expelling intuition from number theory and analysis [Frege, by Dummett] |
8642 | Abstraction from things produces concepts, and numbers are in the concepts [Frege] |
8621 | Mental states are irrelevant to mathematics, because they are vague and fluctuating [Frege] |
8643 | Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege] |
8911 | If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege] |
8634 | The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege] |
17443 | Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege] |
17445 | Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck] |
10539 | Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett] |
17431 | Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki] |
13879 | For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C] |
10642 | Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo] |
10032 | 'Ancestral' relations are derived by iterating back from a given relation [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10606 | Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P] |
27 | Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle] |
5130 | It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle] |
28 | How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle] |
8647 | Not all objects are spatial; 4 can still be an object, despite lacking spatial co-ordinates [Frege] |
10309 | Frege says singular terms denote objects, numerals are singular terms, so numbers exist [Frege, by Hale] |
10550 | Frege establishes abstract objects independently from concrete ones, by falling under a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
8785 | For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
10278 | Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro] |
17432 | Frege's universe comes already divided into objects [Frege, by Koslicki] |
16022 | The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan] |
11100 | Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine] |
12153 | Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege] |
9853 | Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett] |
17623 | To understand a thought you must understand its logical structure [Frege, by Burge] |
4391 | Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth [Aristotle] |
2573 | To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence [Aristotle] |
9158 | For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege] |
8657 | Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege] |
9352 | An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege] |
16889 | A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege] |
2514 | Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz] |
5220 | Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle] |
22141 | It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle] |
95 | If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle] |
79 | Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle] |
16900 | Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge] |
16903 | Justifications show the ordering of truths, and the foundation is what is self-evident [Frege, by Jeshion] |
8624 | Induction is merely psychological, with a principle that it can actually establish laws [Frege] |
8626 | In science one observation can create high probability, while a thousand might prove nothing [Frege] |
8648 | Ideas are not spatial, and don't have distances between them [Frege] |
5146 | Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle] |
5147 | In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle] |
5148 | The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle] |
5232 | If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle] |
5145 | The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle] |
5266 | It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle] |
8007 | Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre] |
12961 | For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz] |
4118 | A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle] |
20192 | Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski] |
4405 | The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle] |
8620 | Thought is the same everywhere, and the laws of thought do not vary [Frege] |
5160 | There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle] |
4326 | Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle] |
72 | Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle] |
9870 | Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett] |
13878 | Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C] |
7736 | A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner] |
17430 | Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki] |
8622 | Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege] |
8651 | A concept is a possible predicate of a singular judgement [Frege] |
9846 | Defining 'direction' by parallelism doesn't tell you whether direction is a line [Dummett on Frege] |
9976 | Frege accepts abstraction to the concept of all sets equipollent to a given one [Tait on Frege] |
10803 | Frege himself abstracts away from tone and color [Yablo on Frege] |
9988 | If we abstract 'from' two cats, the units are not black or white, or cats [Tait on Frege] |
9855 | Frege's logical abstaction identifies a common feature as the maximal set of equivalent objects [Frege, by Dummett] |
10802 | Frege's 'parallel' and 'direction' don't have the same content, as we grasp 'parallel' first [Yablo on Frege] |
10525 | Frege put the idea of abstraction on a rigorous footing [Frege, by Fine,K] |
10526 | Fregean abstraction creates concepts which are equivalences between initial items [Frege, by Fine,K] |
10556 | We create new abstract concepts by carving up the content in a different way [Frege] |
9882 | You can't simultaneously fix the truth-conditions of a sentence and the domain of its variables [Dummett on Frege] |
9881 | From basing 'parallel' on identity of direction, Frege got all abstractions from identity statements [Frege, by Dummett] |
8646 | Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege] |
7732 | Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege] |
9370 | A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian] |
8743 | Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro] |
20295 | All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey] |
2515 | Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege] |
4380 | Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
23320 | Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
5211 | An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle] |
5221 | Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle] |
4383 | Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
68 | The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle] |
4318 | Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham] |
4372 | Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
5254 | Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle] |
5255 | A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle] |
23317 | Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
23318 | Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
5257 | Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle] |
69 | We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle] |
5247 | Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle] |
80 | Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle] |
5249 | One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle] |
82 | The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle] |
20212 | Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle] |
4371 | Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
73 | Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle] |
67 | Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle] |
5218 | Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle] |
81 | For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle] |
5267 | Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle] |
5213 | If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle] |
4384 | For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle] |
5212 | A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle] |
52 | We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure [Aristotle] |
45 | We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle] |
5153 | There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle] |
46 | We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle] |
5134 | Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle] |
31 | If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle] |
5231 | To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle] |
5234 | For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle] |
5075 | Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle] |
21 | Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle] |
4370 | For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
18227 | We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle] |
4381 | How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
33 | Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle] |
5154 | Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle] |
5268 | Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle] |
5229 | The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle] |
90 | All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle] |
5262 | Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle] |
5263 | Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle] |
2689 | Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle] |
101 | Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle] |
5142 | Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle] |
5243 | The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle] |
92 | Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle] |
3559 | For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas] |
5128 | Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle] |
5129 | There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle] |
20 | The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle] |
5131 | Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle] |
5135 | Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle] |
5269 | Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle] |
23 | The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle] |
109 | Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle] |
26 | Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle] |
5136 | Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle] |
25 | You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle] |
18673 | Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi] |
5127 | Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle] |
5143 | Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle] |
2681 | Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle] |
5132 | Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle] |
30 | Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle] |
39 | Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle] |
5139 | If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle] |
5144 | Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle] |
106 | The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle] |
100 | The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle] |
4374 | For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
383 | God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle] |
5270 | Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle] |
5230 | There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle] |
5259 | If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle] |
96 | Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle] |
97 | There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle] |
98 | It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle] |
99 | If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle] |
5256 | Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle] |
5258 | While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle] |
49 | Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle] |
53 | Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle] |
84 | The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle] |
88 | Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity [Aristotle] |
91 | A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best [Aristotle] |
71 | Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste [Aristotle] |
34 | The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue [Aristotle] |
5137 | Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that [Aristotle] |
4342 | Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse on Aristotle] |
4382 | Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman on Aristotle] |
54 | Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done [Aristotle] |
58 | If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions [Aristotle] |
4373 | Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
63 | Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment [Aristotle] |
5214 | Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown [Aristotle] |
107 | A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness [Aristotle] |
5215 | There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action [Aristotle] |
5216 | An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown [Aristotle] |
55 | People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just [Aristotle] |
5149 | The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral [Aristotle] |
5156 | How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? [Aristotle] |
5157 | If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well [Aristotle] |
4369 | It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg] |
5158 | Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle] |
5237 | We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle] |
3548 | Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle] |
5223 | We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle] |
4367 | Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle] |
4362 | Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle] |
5225 | The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine [Aristotle] |
56 | A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves [Aristotle] |
93 | Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness [Aristotle] |
44 | We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle] |
51 | True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle] |
43 | Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle] |
5152 | Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle] |
4378 | We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
6793 | People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle] |
57 | We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle] |
2690 | Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle] |
5222 | A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant [Aristotle] |
4394 | People develop their characters through the activities they pursue [Aristotle] |
5239 | When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly [Aristotle] |
4379 | It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument [Aristotle] |
4386 | Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
5250 | The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness [Aristotle] |
3545 | The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas] |
47 | Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle] |
4406 | Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle] |
60 | The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle] |
61 | Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle] |
4388 | One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle] |
4387 | In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle] |
62 | We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle] |
5159 | The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle] |
65 | The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle] |
5161 | To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle] |
5235 | Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle] |
5238 | The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle] |
5217 | At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle] |
5236 | It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle] |
64 | There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong [Aristotle] |
4117 | Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B on Aristotle] |
5251 | Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue [Aristotle] |
5240 | The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation [Aristotle] |
5261 | Between friends there is no need for justice [Aristotle] |
5151 | Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people [Aristotle] |
4389 | What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson on Aristotle] |
23556 | Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character [Aristotle] |
5242 | Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness [Aristotle] |
5224 | Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death [Aristotle] |
5226 | True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation [Aristotle] |
5233 | Honour is clearly the greatest external good [Aristotle] |
4119 | If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Aristotle, by Williams,B] |
24 | Honour depends too much on the person who awards it [Aristotle] |
104 | Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man [Aristotle] |
18229 | Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain [Aristotle] |
5272 | The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life [Aristotle] |
18232 | The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? [Aristotle] |
110 | Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate [Aristotle] |
105 | We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us [Aristotle] |
111 | The more people contemplate, the happier they are [Aristotle] |
5138 | The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth [Aristotle] |
38 | A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless [Aristotle] |
1665 | It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster [Aristotle] |
108 | The virtue of generosity requires money [Aristotle] |
2686 | Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM on Aristotle] |
2687 | For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM on Aristotle] |
85 | Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends [Aristotle] |
5252 | 'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle] |
5245 | Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil [Aristotle] |
5265 | Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being [Aristotle] |
5133 | Man is by nature a social being [Aristotle] |
86 | A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible [Aristotle] |
5140 | Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens [Aristotle] |
21046 | The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens [Aristotle] |
5241 | We hold that every piece of legislation is just [Aristotle] |
87 | Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality [Aristotle] |
5260 | Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice [Aristotle] |
5264 | Friendship is based on a community of sharing [Aristotle] |
21047 | Aristotle thought slavery is just if it is both necessary and natural [Aristotle, by Sandel] |
21044 | For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Aristotle, by Sandel] |
5246 | Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance [Aristotle] |
8619 | To learn something, you must know that you don't know [Frege] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
5150 | Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit [Aristotle] |
5228 | A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed [Aristotle] |
2684 | Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin on Aristotle] |
5227 | The nature of any given thing is determined by its end [Aristotle] |
5219 | Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency [Aristotle] |
8656 | The laws of number are not laws of nature, but are laws of the laws of nature [Frege] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
22286 | Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter] |
8644 | Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege] |
24037 | We all assume immortality is impossible [Aristotle] |