30 ideas
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
21704 | 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B] |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
21705 | Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B] |
21727 | Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B] |
21719 | Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B] |
21723 | The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B] |
21721 | Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B] |
21703 | Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B] |
21714 | The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B] |
21713 | Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B] |
21715 | For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B] |
21729 | Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B] |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |