85 ideas
11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
4588 | There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil] |
18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
4616 | A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil] |
18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
4603 | Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil] |
4617 | A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil] |
4615 | Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil] |
4612 | Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil] |
4587 | From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil] |
6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
4611 | The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil] |
18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
4592 | If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil] |
4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
4591 | Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil] |
4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |
4621 | Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil] |
4623 | Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil] |
4626 | The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil] |
4622 | Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil] |
4590 | If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil] |
4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
4595 | No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil] |
4599 | Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil] |
4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
4601 | Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil] |
4602 | Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil] |
4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
4597 | Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil] |
4609 | It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil] |
4596 | The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil] |
4598 | Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil] |
4619 | 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil] |
4620 | Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil] |
4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |
4625 | Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil] |
4607 | Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil] |
4605 | Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil] |
4606 | To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil] |
4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
4604 | If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil] |
21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |