79 ideas
14456 | 'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell] |
10308 | Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale] |
14426 | A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell] |
10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
8468 | The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false [Russell, by Orenstein] |
14454 | An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell] |
14453 | The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M? [Russell] |
14427 | We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes [Russell] |
14428 | Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous [Russell] |
14447 | Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms' [Russell] |
14440 | We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them [Russell] |
14443 | The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency [Russell] |
14445 | Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater [Russell] |
14444 | Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered [Russell] |
14446 | We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class [Russell] |
14459 | Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function [Russell] |
14461 | Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions [Russell] |
8469 | Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions [Russell, by Orenstein] |
8745 | Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world [Russell] |
14452 | All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell] |
14462 | In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell] |
10057 | Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell] |
12444 | Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell] |
14464 | Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell] |
14458 | Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell] |
10450 | Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach] |
14457 | Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
10316 | We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale] |
10312 | Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale] |
10313 | Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale] |
10322 | If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale] |
7311 | The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
14455 | 'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell] |
14442 | If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common [Russell] |
14438 | New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations [Russell] |
13510 | Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression? [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
14436 | A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum [Russell] |
14439 | A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers [Russell] |
14421 | Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult [Russell] |
14424 | Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties [Russell] |
14441 | The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive [Russell] |
14420 | Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics [Russell] |
14431 | The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms [Russell] |
14422 | Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms [Russell] |
14423 | '0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms [Russell] |
14425 | A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell] |
14434 | What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature [Russell] |
14465 | Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men' [Russell] |
13414 | For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets [Russell, by Benacerraf] |
14449 | There is always something psychological about inference [Russell] |
14463 | Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell] |
10512 | The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale] |
10517 | Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale] |
10519 | The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale] |
10520 | Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale] |
10524 | There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale] |
14429 | Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell] |
14430 | If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive [Russell] |
14432 | 'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a [Russell] |
10521 | If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale] |
10511 | It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale] |
10318 | Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale] |
10310 | Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale] |
10518 | Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale] |
10513 | Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale] |
10514 | If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale] |
10523 | Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale] |
10307 | The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale] |
10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
14435 | The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell] |
10522 | The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale] |
10321 | We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale] |
12197 | Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell] |
14450 | All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell] |
14460 | If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell] |
14433 | Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell] |
14451 | Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |