48 ideas
1627 | Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine] |
17729 | Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins] |
1623 | Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine] |
17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |
9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |
17730 | Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins] |
17738 | Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine] |
17719 | Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins] |
17717 | Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins] |
17724 | It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins] |
17727 | We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins] |
17720 | There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG] |
19492 | Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine] |
17728 | The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins] |
1628 | If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine] |
10929 | Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine] |
12188 | Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge] |
15090 | Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker] |
9383 | Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine] |
12424 | Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher] |
17726 | Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins] |
9337 | Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich] |
9338 | Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine] |
9340 | Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine] |
1620 | Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine] |
1629 | Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine] |
19488 | The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo] |
17734 | It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins] |
17723 | Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins] |
1625 | Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine] |
17739 | The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins] |
17718 | Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins] |
1626 | It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine] |
17731 | Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins] |
7317 | 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A] |
1621 | Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine] |
17732 | Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins] |
9371 | Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine] |
17725 | 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins] |
1622 | Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine] |
9366 | Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian] |
14473 | Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson] |
7321 | The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine] |
8803 | Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine] |
17737 | The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins] |
1624 | If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |