Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A Study of Concepts' and 'works'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
21489 Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
12585 Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
19095 Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
19097 Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
21494 If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
21493 Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
19102 Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
10352 The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13498 Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
21491 Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16376 The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19107 Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
12581 Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
12579 Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
12586 Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
18568 Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
18571 Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
18572 Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12577 Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
12578 A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
12587 Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12584 An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
9335 Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
9336 A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
13304 Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
20820 Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]