Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Kinds of Minds' and 'Metaphysical Dependence'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett]