29 ideas
21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |