14 ideas
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |