Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Universals' and 'The Iliad'

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21 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong]
'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong]
'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong]
'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Homer does not distinguish between soul and body [Homer, by Williams,B]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
Let there be one ruler [Homer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Homer so enjoys the company of the gods that he must have been deeply irreligious [Homer, by Nietzsche]