Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Universals' and 'Vagueness: a global approach'

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26 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K]
Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong]
'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong]
'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong]
'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]