27 ideas
13011 | New axioms are being sought, to determine the size of the continuum [Maddy] |
13013 | The Axiom of Extensionality seems to be analytic [Maddy] |
13014 | Extensional sets are clearer, simpler, unique and expressive [Maddy] |
13021 | The Axiom of Infinity states Cantor's breakthrough that launched modern mathematics [Maddy] |
13022 | Infinite sets are essential for giving an account of the real numbers [Maddy] |
13023 | The Power Set Axiom is needed for, and supported by, accounts of the continuum [Maddy] |
13024 | Efforts to prove the Axiom of Choice have failed [Maddy] |
13025 | Modern views say the Choice set exists, even if it can't be constructed [Maddy] |
13026 | A large array of theorems depend on the Axiom of Choice [Maddy] |
13019 | The Iterative Conception says everything appears at a stage, derived from the preceding appearances [Maddy] |
13018 | Limitation of Size is a vague intuition that over-large sets may generate paradoxes [Maddy] |
4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |