15 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |