15 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
| 23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
| 23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
| 23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
| 23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |