94 ideas
14027 | If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus] |
3426 | If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim] |
14040 | Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus] |
14028 | Nothing comes to be from what doesn't exist [Epicurus] |
14029 | If disappearing things went to nothingness, nothing could return, and it would all be gone by now [Epicurus] |
14030 | The totality is complete, so there is no room for it to change, and nothing extraneous to change it [Epicurus] |
3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
14048 | Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus] |
3437 | 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim] |
3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
14044 | The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus] |
14045 | Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus] |
3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
14046 | A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus] |
14047 | Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus] |
3406 | Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG] |
14039 | Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus] |
14050 | We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus] |
14037 | Atoms only have shape, weight and size, and the properties which accompany shape [Epicurus] |
6010 | Illusions are not false perceptions, as we accurately perceive the pattern of atoms [Epicurus, by Modrak] |
3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
14041 | The soul is fine parts distributed through the body, resembling hot breath [Epicurus] |
3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
3367 | Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim] |
3365 | Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim] |
3360 | Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim] |
3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
3363 | We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim] |
3412 | How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim] |
3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
3439 | Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim] |
3427 | Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim] |
3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
3362 | Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim] |
3413 | Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim] |
3374 | Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim] |
3433 | The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim] |
3377 | Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim] |
14042 | The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus] |
3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
3387 | A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim] |
3410 | Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim] |
3386 | Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim] |
3394 | Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim] |
3382 | A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim] |
3383 | The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim] |
3408 | Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim] |
3420 | Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim] |
3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
3403 | We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim] |
3402 | If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
14032 | Totality has no edge; an edge implies a contrast beyond the edge, and there can't be one [Epicurus] |
14033 | Bodies are unlimited as well as void, since the two necessarily go together [Epicurus] |
14034 | There exists an infinity of each shape of atom, but the number of shapes is beyond our knowledge [Epicurus] |
14035 | Atoms just have shape, size and weight; colour results from their arrangement [Epicurus] |
14038 | There cannot be unlimited division, because it would reduce things to non-existence [Epicurus] |
3401 | A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim] |
3407 | Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim] |
14049 | We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus] |
14043 | The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus] |
14031 | Space must exist, since movement is obvious, and there must be somewhere to move in [Epicurus] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
14036 | There are endless cosmoi, some like and some unlike this one [Epicurus] |