Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Science of Logic' and 'Reason, Truth and History'

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51 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
If we start with indeterminate being, we arrive at being and nothing as a united pair [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality... [Hegel, by Houlgate]
We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objectivity is not by correspondence, but by the historical determined necessity of Geist [Hegel, by Pinkard]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Being and nothing are the same and not the same, which is the identity of identity and non-identity [Hegel]
The so-called world is filled with contradiction [Hegel]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is the instability of thoughts generating their opposite, and then new more complex thoughts [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Hegel's dialectic is not thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but usually negation of negation of the negation [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
To grasp an existence, we must consider its non-existence [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Nothing exists, as thinkable and expressible [Hegel]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Thinking of nothing is not the same as simply not thinking [Hegel, by Houlgate]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
The ground of a thing is not another thing, but the first thing's substance or rational concept [Hegel, by Houlgate]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Kant's thing-in-itself is just an abstraction from our knowledge; things only exist for us [Hegel, by Bowie]
Hegel believe that the genuine categories reveal things in themselves [Hegel, by Houlgate]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis]
The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
The nature of each category relates itself to another [Hegel]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
In absolute knowing, the gap between object and oneself closes, producing certainty [Hegel]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The 'absolute idea' is when all the contradictions are exhausted [Hegel, by Bowie]
Hegel, unlike Kant, said how things appear is the same as how things are [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
Hegel's non-subjective idealism is the unity of subjective and objective viewpoints [Hegel, by Pinkard]
Hegel claimed his system was about the world, but it only mapped conceptual interdependence [Pinkard on Hegel]
The Absolute is the primitive system of concepts which are actualised [Hegel, by Gardner]
Authentic thinking and reality have the same content [Hegel]
The absolute idea is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and all truth [Hegel]
The absolute idea is the great unity of the infinite system of concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam]
Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]