Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Science of Logic' and 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd)'

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85 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
If we start with indeterminate being, we arrive at being and nothing as a united pair [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality... [Hegel, by Houlgate]
We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objectivity is not by correspondence, but by the historical determined necessity of Geist [Hegel, by Pinkard]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Being and nothing are the same and not the same, which is the identity of identity and non-identity [Hegel]
The so-called world is filled with contradiction [Hegel]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is the instability of thoughts generating their opposite, and then new more complex thoughts [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Hegel's dialectic is not thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but usually negation of negation of the negation [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
To grasp an existence, we must consider its non-existence [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Nothing exists, as thinkable and expressible [Hegel]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Thinking of nothing is not the same as simply not thinking [Hegel, by Houlgate]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
The ground of a thing is not another thing, but the first thing's substance or rational concept [Hegel, by Houlgate]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Kant's thing-in-itself is just an abstraction from our knowledge; things only exist for us [Hegel, by Bowie]
Hegel believe that the genuine categories reveal things in themselves [Hegel, by Houlgate]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
The nature of each category relates itself to another [Hegel]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
In absolute knowing, the gap between object and oneself closes, producing certainty [Hegel]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The 'absolute idea' is when all the contradictions are exhausted [Hegel, by Bowie]
Hegel, unlike Kant, said how things appear is the same as how things are [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
Hegel's non-subjective idealism is the unity of subjective and objective viewpoints [Hegel, by Pinkard]
Hegel claimed his system was about the world, but it only mapped conceptual interdependence [Pinkard on Hegel]
The Absolute is the primitive system of concepts which are actualised [Hegel, by Gardner]
Authentic thinking and reality have the same content [Hegel]
The absolute idea is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and all truth [Hegel]
The absolute idea is the great unity of the infinite system of concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton]
We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton]
Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton]
We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton]
My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton]
A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton]
We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton]
To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton]
Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton]
A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton]
Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton]
Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton]
An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton]
An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton]
Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton]
With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton]
We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton]
Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton]
To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton]
Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton]
Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton]
Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton]
Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton]
The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton]
IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton]
Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton]
IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton]
A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton]
We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton]
Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton]
The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton]
Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]