353 ideas
21875 | The wisdom of a free man is a meditation on life, not on death [Spinoza] |
17230 | If we are not wholly wise, we should live by good rules and maxims [Spinoza] |
13876 | The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C] |
8415 | Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object [Frege] |
9841 | Frege was the first to give linguistic answers to non-linguistic questions [Frege, by Dummett] |
9840 | Frege initiated linguistic philosophy, studying number through the sense of sentences [Frege, by Dummett] |
17200 | We must be careful to keep words distinct from ideas and images [Spinoza] |
15948 | Frege developed formal systems to avoid unnoticed assumptions [Frege, by Lavine] |
17194 | Reason only explains what is universal, so it is timeless, under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza] |
4840 | Reason perceives things under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza] |
10804 | Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo] |
17213 | In so far as men live according to reason, they will agree with one another [Spinoza] |
9832 | Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege] |
8414 | Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege] |
4819 | There is necessarily for each existent thing a cause why it should exist [Spinoza] |
9844 | Originally Frege liked contextual definitions, but later preferred them fully explicit [Frege, by Dummett] |
9822 | Nothing should be defined in terms of that to which it is conceptually prior [Frege, by Dummett] |
17495 | Proof aims to remove doubts, but also to show the interdependence of truths [Frege] |
8632 | You can't transfer external properties unchanged to apply to ideas [Frege] |
21864 | Truth is its own standard [Spinoza] |
8018 | Spinoza's life shows that love of truth which he proclaims as the highest value [MacIntyre on Spinoza] |
5641 | For Spinoza, 'adequacy' is the intrinsic mark of truth [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
13881 | We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C] |
4816 | A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object [Spinoza] |
9154 | Frege agreed with Euclid that the axioms of logic and mathematics are known through self-evidence [Frege, by Burge] |
9157 | The null set is only defensible if it is the extension of an empty concept [Frege, by Burge] |
9835 | It is because a concept can be empty that there is such a thing as the empty class [Frege, by Dummett] |
9854 | We can introduce new objects, as equivalence classes of objects already known [Frege, by Dummett] |
9883 | Frege introduced the standard device, of defining logical objects with equivalence classes [Frege, by Dummett] |
18104 | Frege, unlike Russell, has infinite individuals because numbers are individuals [Frege, by Bostock] |
9834 | A class is, for Frege, the extension of a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
20309 | If our ideas are adequate, what follows from them is also adequate [Spinoza] |
8645 | Convert "Jupiter has four moons" into "the number of Jupiter's moons is four" [Frege] |
16891 | Despite Gödel, Frege's epistemic ordering of all the truths is still plausible [Frege, by Burge] |
16906 | The primitive simples of arithmetic are the essence, determining the subject, and its boundaries [Frege, by Jeshion] |
14236 | Each horse doesn't fall under the concept 'horse that draws the carriage', because all four are needed [Oliver/Smiley on Frege] |
22294 | We can show that a concept is consistent by producing something which falls under it [Frege] |
17624 | To understand axioms you must grasp their logical power and priority [Frege, by Burge] |
17185 | Mathematics deals with the essences and properties of forms [Spinoza] |
17222 | The sum of its angles follows from a triangle's nature [Spinoza] |
17197 | The idea of a triangle involves truths about it, so those are part of its essence [Spinoza] |
8640 | We cannot define numbers from the idea of a series, because numbers must precede that [Frege] |
9838 | Treating 0 as a number avoids antinomies involving treating 'nobody' as a person [Frege, by Dummett] |
9564 | For Frege 'concept' and 'extension' are primitive, but 'zero' and 'successor' are defined [Frege, by Chihara] |
10551 | If objects exist because they fall under a concept, 0 is the object under which no objects fall [Frege, by Dummett] |
8653 | Nought is the number belonging to the concept 'not identical with itself' [Frege] |
8636 | We can say 'a and b are F' if F is 'wise', but not if it is 'one' [Frege] |
8654 | One is the Number which belongs to the concept "identical with 0" [Frege] |
8641 | You can abstract concepts from the moon, but the number one is not among them [Frege] |
9989 | Units can be equal without being identical [Tait on Frege] |
17429 | Frege says only concepts which isolate and avoid arbitrary division can give units [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17427 | Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17437 | Non-arbitrary division means that what falls under the concept cannot be divided into more of the same [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17438 | Our concepts decide what is countable, as in seeing the leaves of the tree, or the foliage [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17426 | A concept creating a unit must isolate and unify what falls under it [Frege] |
17428 | Frege says counting is determining what number belongs to a given concept [Frege, by Koslicki] |
15916 | Frege's one-to-one correspondence replaces well-ordering, because infinities can't be counted [Frege, by Lavine] |
10034 | The number of natural numbers is not a natural number [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
16883 | Arithmetical statements can't be axioms, because they are provable [Frege, by Burge] |
17460 | A statement of number contains a predication about a concept [Frege] |
16890 | Frege's problem is explaining the particularity of numbers by general laws [Frege, by Burge] |
8630 | Individual numbers are best derived from the number one, and increase by one [Frege] |
11029 | 'Exactly ten gallons' may not mean ten things instantiate 'gallon' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
10013 | Numerical statements have first-order logical form, so must refer to objects [Frege, by Hodes] |
18181 | The Number for F is the extension of 'equal to F' (or maybe just F itself) [Frege] |
18103 | Numbers are objects because they partake in identity statements [Frege, by Bostock] |
10625 | Frege had a motive to treat numbers as objects, but not a justification [Hale/Wright on Frege] |
13871 | Frege claims that numbers are objects, as opposed to them being Fregean concepts [Frege, by Wright,C] |
13872 | Numbers are second-level, ascribing properties to concepts rather than to objects [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9816 | For Frege, successor was a relation, not a function [Frege, by Dummett] |
9953 | Numbers are more than just 'second-level concepts', since existence is also one [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9954 | "Number of x's such that ..x.." is a functional expression, yielding a name when completed [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10139 | Frege gives an incoherent account of extensions resulting from abstraction [Fine,K on Frege] |
10028 | For Frege the number of F's is a collection of first-level concepts [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
17636 | A cardinal number may be defined as a class of similar classes [Frege, by Russell] |
10029 | Numbers need to be objects, to define the extension of the concept of each successor to n [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9973 | The number of F's is the extension of the second level concept 'is equipollent with F' [Frege, by Tait] |
16500 | Frege showed that numbers attach to concepts, not to objects [Frege, by Wiggins] |
9990 | Frege replaced Cantor's sets as the objects of equinumerosity attributions with concepts [Frege, by Tait] |
7738 | Zero is defined using 'is not self-identical', and one by using the concept of zero [Frege, by Weiner] |
23456 | Frege said logical predication implies classes, which are arithmetical objects [Frege, by Morris,M] |
13887 | Frege started with contextual definition, but then switched to explicit extensional definition [Frege, by Wright,C] |
13897 | Each number, except 0, is the number of the concept of all of its predecessors [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9856 | Frege's account of cardinals fails in modern set theory, so they are now defined differently [Dummett on Frege] |
9902 | Frege's incorrect view is that a number is an equivalence class [Benacerraf on Frege] |
17814 | The natural number n is the set of n-membered sets [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
17819 | A set doesn't have a fixed number, because the elements can be seen in different ways [Yourgrau on Frege] |
17820 | If you can subdivide objects many ways for counting, you can do that to set-elements too [Yourgrau on Frege] |
9956 | 'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
13527 | Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS] |
22292 | Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter] |
17442 | Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck] |
11030 | The words 'There are exactly Julius Caesar moons of Mars' are gibberish [Rumfitt on Frege] |
10030 | 'Julius Caesar' isn't a number because numbers inherit properties of 0 and successor [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
8690 | From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number? [Frege, by Friend] |
10219 | Frege said 2 is the extension of all pairs (so Julius Caesar isn't 2, because he's not an extension) [Frege, by Shapiro] |
13889 | Fregean numbers are numbers, and not 'Caesar', because they correlate 1-1 [Frege, by Wright,C] |
18142 | One-one correlations imply normal arithmetic, but don't explain our concept of a number [Frege, by Bostock] |
9046 | Our definition will not tell us whether or not Julius Caesar is a number [Frege] |
16896 | If numbers can be derived from logic, then set theory is superfluous [Frege, by Burge] |
8639 | If numbers are supposed to be patterns, each number can have many patterns [Frege] |
13874 | Numbers seem to be objects because they exactly fit the inference patterns for identities [Frege] |
13875 | Frege's platonism proposes that objects are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Wright,C] |
7731 | How can numbers be external (one pair of boots is two boots), or subjective (and so relative)? [Frege, by Weiner] |
7737 | Identities refer to objects, so numbers must be objects [Frege, by Weiner] |
8635 | Numbers are not physical, and not ideas - they are objective and non-sensible [Frege] |
8652 | Numbers are objects, because they can take the definite article, and can't be plurals [Frege] |
17816 | Frege's logicism aimed at removing the reliance of arithmetic on intuition [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
8633 | There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege] |
9951 | It appears that numbers are adjectives, but they don't apply to a single object [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9952 | Numerical adjectives are of the same second-level type as the existential quantifier [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
11031 | 'Jupiter has many moons' won't read as 'The number of Jupiter's moons equals the number many' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
8637 | The number 'one' can't be a property, if any object can be viewed as one or not one [Frege] |
9999 | For science, we can translate adjectival numbers into noun form [Frege] |
7739 | Arithmetic is analytic [Frege, by Weiner] |
9945 | Logicism shows that no empirical truths are needed to justify arithmetic [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
8782 | Frege offered a Platonist version of logicism, committed to cardinal and real numbers [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
13608 | Mathematics has no special axioms of its own, but follows from principles of logic (with definitions) [Frege, by Bostock] |
16905 | Arithmetic must be based on logic, because of its total generality [Frege, by Jeshion] |
5658 | Numbers are definable in terms of mapping items which fall under concepts [Frege, by Scruton] |
8655 | Arithmetic is analytic and a priori, and thus it is part of logic [Frege] |
10831 | Frege only managed to prove that arithmetic was analytic with a logic that included set-theory [Quine on Frege] |
13864 | Frege's platonism and logicism are in conflict, if logic must dictates an infinity of objects [Wright,C on Frege] |
10033 | Why should the existence of pure logic entail the existence of objects? [George/Velleman on Frege] |
10010 | Frege's belief in logicism and in numerical objects seem uncomfortable together [Hodes on Frege] |
9631 | Formalism fails to recognise types of symbols, and also meta-games [Frege, by Brown,JR] |
9875 | Frege was completing Bolzano's work, of expelling intuition from number theory and analysis [Frege, by Dummett] |
8642 | Abstraction from things produces concepts, and numbers are in the concepts [Frege] |
8621 | Mental states are irrelevant to mathematics, because they are vague and fluctuating [Frege] |
8643 | Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege] |
17174 | Outside the mind, there are just things and their properties [Spinoza] |
17176 | The more reality a thing has, the more attributes it has [Spinoza] |
8911 | If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege] |
8634 | The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege] |
17179 | There must always be a reason or cause why some triangle does or does not exist [Spinoza] |
17186 | Men say they prefer order, not realising that we imagine the order [Spinoza] |
17443 | Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege] |
17445 | Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck] |
10539 | Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett] |
20127 | Laws of nature are universal, so everything must be understood through those laws [Spinoza] |
17431 | Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki] |
13879 | For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C] |
10642 | Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo] |
10032 | 'Ancestral' relations are derived by iterating back from a given relation [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10606 | Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P] |
17170 | An 'attribute' is what the intellect takes as constituting an essence [Spinoza] |
17171 | A 'mode' is an aspect of a substance, and conceived through that substance [Spinoza] |
17195 | Things persevere through a force which derives from God [Spinoza] |
17206 | The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza] |
17192 | The 'universal' term 'man' is just imagining whatever is the same in a multitude of men [Spinoza] |
8647 | Not all objects are spatial; 4 can still be an object, despite lacking spatial co-ordinates [Frege] |
10309 | Frege says singular terms denote objects, numerals are singular terms, so numbers exist [Frege, by Hale] |
10550 | Frege establishes abstract objects independently from concrete ones, by falling under a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
8785 | For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
10278 | Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro] |
17432 | Frege's universe comes already divided into objects [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17188 | A thing is unified if its parts produce a single effect [Spinoza] |
5639 | Spinoza implies that thought is impossible without the notion of substance [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
21857 | Substance is the power of self-actualisation [Spinoza, by Lord] |
4813 | Substance is that of which an independent conception can be formed [Spinoza] |
4828 | The essence of a thing is what is required for it to exist or be conceived [Spinoza] |
17187 | Essence gives existence and conception to things, and is inseparable from them [Spinoza] |
17191 | Nothing is essential if it is in every part, and is common to everything [Spinoza] |
17184 | All natures of things produce some effect [Spinoza] |
17205 | Only an external cause can destroy something [Spinoza] |
16022 | The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan] |
11100 | Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine] |
12153 | Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege] |
9853 | Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett] |
17175 | There cannot be two substances with the same attributes [Spinoza] |
17173 | Two substances can't be the same if they have different attributes [Spinoza] |
17183 | Things are impossible if they imply contradiction, or their production lacks an external cause [Spinoza] |
4299 | Contingency is an illusion, resulting from our inadequate understanding [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
4824 | We only call things 'contingent' in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge [Spinoza] |
4839 | Reason naturally regards things as necessary, and only imagination considers them contingent [Spinoza] |
4822 | Divine nature makes all existence and operations necessary, and nothing is contingent [Spinoza] |
17182 | Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause [Spinoza] |
4818 | People who are ignorant of true causes imagine anything can change into anything else [Spinoza] |
20310 | Error does not result from imagining, but from lacking the evidence of impossibility [Spinoza] |
17208 | A horse would be destroyed if it were changed into a man or an insect [Spinoza] |
17209 | A thing is contingent if nothing in its essence determines whether or not it exists [Spinoza] |
5640 | Spinoza's three levels of knowledge are perception/imagination, then principles, then intuitions [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
17211 | Understanding is the sole aim of reason, and the only profit for the mind [Spinoza] |
17623 | To understand a thought you must understand its logical structure [Frege, by Burge] |
21801 | Unlike Descartes' atomism, Spinoza held a holistic view of belief [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
21863 | You only know you are certain of something when you actually are certain of it [Spinoza] |
17199 | A man who assents without doubt to a falsehood is not certain, but lacks a cause to make him waver [Spinoza] |
17193 | True ideas intrinsically involve the highest degree of certainty [Spinoza] |
5638 | 'I think' is useless, because it is contingent, and limited to the first person [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
9158 | For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege] |
8657 | Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege] |
9352 | An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege] |
16889 | A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege] |
2514 | Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz] |
4831 | If the body is affected by an external object, the mind can't help believing that the object exists [Spinoza] |
4865 | The eyes of the mind are proofs [Spinoza] |
20306 | Once we have experienced two feelings together, one will always give rise to the other [Spinoza] |
16900 | Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge] |
4835 | Anyone who knows, must know that they know, and even know that they know that they know.. [Spinoza] |
16903 | Justifications show the ordering of truths, and the foundation is what is self-evident [Frege, by Jeshion] |
20308 | Encounters with things confuse the mind, and internal comparisons bring clarity [Spinoza] |
8624 | Induction is merely psychological, with a principle that it can actually establish laws [Frege] |
8626 | In science one observation can create high probability, while a thousand might prove nothing [Frege] |
4312 | To understand a phenomenon, we must understand why it is necessary, not merely contingent [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
4833 | The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body [Spinoza] |
16198 | Knowledge is the essence of the mind [Spinoza] |
17198 | Will and intellect are the same thing [Spinoza] |
17201 | The will is finite, but the intellect is infinite [Spinoza] |
17196 | The will is not a desire, but the faculty of affirming what is true or false [Spinoza] |
8648 | Ideas are not spatial, and don't have distances between them [Frege] |
21805 | Spinoza held that the mind is just a bundle of ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
17204 | Animals are often observed to be wiser than people [Spinoza] |
17212 | To understand is the absolute virtue of the mind [Spinoza] |
21804 | Faculties are either fictions, or the abstract universals of ideas [Spinoza] |
4832 | If the body is affected by two things together, the imagining of one will conjure up the other [Spinoza] |
21869 | Our own force of persevering is nothing in comparison with external forces [Spinoza] |
20307 | As far as possible, everything tries to persevere [Spinoza] |
21803 | The conatus (striving) of mind and body together is appetite, which is the essence of man [Spinoza] |
4836 | The mind only knows itself by means of ideas of the modification of the body [Spinoza] |
21861 | Self-knowledge needs perception of the affections of the body [Spinoza] |
17216 | The poet who forgot his own tragedies was no longer the same man [Spinoza] |
4814 | A thing is free if it acts by necessity of its own nature, and the act is determined by itself alone [Spinoza] |
21802 | An act of will can only occur if it has been caused, which implies a regress of causes [Spinoza] |
4837 | 'Free will' is a misunderstanding arising from awareness of our actions, but ignorance of their causes [Spinoza] |
4843 | Would we die if we lacked free will, and were poised between equal foods? Yes! [Spinoza] |
4844 | The mind is not free to remember or forget anything [Spinoza] |
4311 | We think we are free because we don't know the causes of our desires and choices [Spinoza] |
7828 | The actual world is the only one God could have created [Spinoza] |
21860 | Ideas and things have identical connections and order [Spinoza] |
4308 | Mind and body are one thing, seen sometimes as thought and sometimes as extension [Spinoza] |
4846 | We are incapable of formulating an idea which excludes the existence of our body [Spinoza] |
4834 | Mind and body are the same thing, sometimes seen as thought, and sometimes as extension [Spinoza] |
8620 | Thought is the same everywhere, and the laws of thought do not vary [Frege] |
23951 | Emotion is a modification of bodily energy, controlling our actions [Spinoza] |
4849 | The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain and desire [Spinoza] |
23990 | The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain, and desire [Spinoza, by Goldie] |
17203 | Minds are subject to passions if they have inadequate ideas [Spinoza] |
4864 | An emotion is only bad if it hinders us from thinking [Spinoza] |
7832 | Stoics want to suppress emotions, but Spinoza overcomes them with higher emotions [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
4863 | An emotion comes more under our control in proportion to how well it is known to us [Spinoza] |
4841 | People make calculation mistakes by misjudging the figures, not calculating them wrongly [Spinoza] |
21807 | Ideas are powerful entities, which can produce further ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
4830 | An 'idea' is a mental conception which is actively formed by the mind in thinking [Spinoza] |
4842 | Ideas are not images formed in the brain, but are the conceptions of thought [Spinoza] |
20311 | An idea involves affirmation or negation [Spinoza] |
9870 | Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett] |
13878 | Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C] |
7736 | A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner] |
17430 | Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki] |
8622 | Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege] |
8651 | A concept is a possible predicate of a singular judgement [Frege] |
9846 | Defining 'direction' by parallelism doesn't tell you whether direction is a line [Dummett on Frege] |
9976 | Frege accepts abstraction to the concept of all sets equipollent to a given one [Tait on Frege] |
10803 | Frege himself abstracts away from tone and color [Yablo on Frege] |
9988 | If we abstract 'from' two cats, the units are not black or white, or cats [Tait on Frege] |
9855 | Frege's logical abstaction identifies a common feature as the maximal set of equivalent objects [Frege, by Dummett] |
10802 | Frege's 'parallel' and 'direction' don't have the same content, as we grasp 'parallel' first [Yablo on Frege] |
10525 | Frege put the idea of abstraction on a rigorous footing [Frege, by Fine,K] |
10526 | Fregean abstraction creates concepts which are equivalences between initial items [Frege, by Fine,K] |
10556 | We create new abstract concepts by carving up the content in a different way [Frege] |
9882 | You can't simultaneously fix the truth-conditions of a sentence and the domain of its variables [Dummett on Frege] |
9881 | From basing 'parallel' on identity of direction, Frege got all abstractions from identity statements [Frege, by Dummett] |
8646 | Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege] |
7732 | Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege] |
9370 | A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian] |
8743 | Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro] |
20295 | All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey] |
2515 | Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege] |
4838 | Claiming that actions depend on the will is meaningless; no one knows what the will is [Spinoza] |
4309 | Spinoza argues that in reality the will and the intellect are 'one and the same' [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
20305 | Whenever we act, then desire is our very essence [Spinoza] |
21868 | We love or hate people more strongly because we think they are free [Spinoza] |
17202 | We are the source of an action if only our nature can explain the action [Spinoza] |
21865 | We act when it follows from our nature, and is understood in that way [Spinoza] |
21873 | Men only agree in nature if they are guided by reason [Spinoza] |
21872 | We seek our own advantage, and virtue is doing this rationally [Spinoza] |
17189 | The essence of man is modifications of the nature of God [Spinoza] |
17207 | By 'good' I mean what brings us ever closer to our model of human nature [Spinoza] |
8019 | Along with his pantheism, Spinoza equates ethics with the study of human nature [Spinoza, by MacIntyre] |
17229 | If infancy in humans was very rare, we would consider it a pitiful natural defect [Spinoza] |
4845 | We don't want things because they are good; we judge things to be good because we want them [Spinoza] |
17217 | Love is joy with an external cause [Spinoza] |
4848 | Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause [Spinoza] |
7833 | Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
17224 | If our ideas were wholly adequate, we would have no concept of evil [Spinoza] |
21870 | Music is good for a melancholic, bad for a mourner, and indifferent to the deaf [Spinoza] |
4860 | Man's highest happiness consists of perfecting his understanding, or reason [Spinoza] |
4847 | Pleasure is a passive state in which the mind increases in perfection [Spinoza] |
4859 | Pleasure is only bad in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action [Spinoza] |
4851 | Reason demands nothing contrary to nature, and so it demands self-love [Spinoza] |
17220 | Self-satisfaction is the highest thing for which we can hope [Spinoza] |
4852 | Both virtue and happiness are based on the preservation of one's own being [Spinoza] |
17214 | To act virtuously is to act rationally [Spinoza] |
21871 | The more we strive for our own advantage, the more virtuous we are [Spinoza] |
17210 | All virtue is founded on self-preservation [Spinoza] |
4856 | To live according to reason is to live according to the laws of human nature [Spinoza] |
17221 | A man ignorant of himself is ignorant of all of the virtues [Spinoza] |
17225 | In a free man, choosing flight can show as much strength of mind as fighting [Spinoza] |
17219 | A person unmoved by either reason or pity to help others is rightly called 'inhuman' [Spinoza] |
4857 | Pity is a bad and useless thing, as it is a pain, and rational people perform good deeds without it [Spinoza] |
17223 | Pity is not a virtue, but at least it shows a desire to live uprightly [Spinoza] |
17218 | People who live according to reason should avoid pity [Spinoza] |
17228 | Rational people judge money by needs, and live contented with very little [Spinoza] |
4853 | Rational people are self-interested, but also desire the same goods for other people [Spinoza] |
4858 | A rational person will want others to have the goods he seeks for himself [Spinoza] |
4855 | If people are obedient to reason, they will live in harmony [Spinoza] |
21874 | The ideal for human preservation is unanimity among people [Spinoza] |
8020 | Only self-knowledge can liberate us [Spinoza, by MacIntyre] |
7412 | Spinoza extended Hobbes's natural rights to cover all possible desires and actions [Spinoza, by Tuck] |
17227 | Slavery is a disgraceful crime [Spinoza] |
8619 | To learn something, you must know that you don't know [Frege] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
17226 | The best use of talent is to teach other people to live rationally [Spinoza] |
4854 | It is impossible that the necessity of a person's nature should produce a desire for non-existence [Spinoza] |
17215 | Animals feel, but that doesn't mean we can't use them for our pleasure and profit [Spinoza] |
17190 | We can easily think of nature as one individual [Spinoza] |
4826 | Nature has no particular goal in view, and final causes are mere human figments [Spinoza] |
1587 | Spinoza strongly attacked teleology, which is the lifeblood of classical logos [Roochnik on Spinoza] |
1588 | For Spinoza eyes don't act for purposes, but follow mechanical necessity [Roochnik on Spinoza] |
12731 | Final causes are figments of human imagination [Spinoza] |
4821 | An infinite line can be marked in feet or inches, so one infinity is twelve times the other [Spinoza] |
17177 | In nature there is just one infinite substance [Spinoza] |
4850 | A final cause is simply a human desire [Spinoza] |
4815 | From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows [Spinoza] |
8656 | The laws of number are not laws of nature, but are laws of the laws of nature [Frege] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
7835 | The key question for Spinoza is: is his God really a God? [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
17231 | God feels no emotions, of joy or sorrow [Spinoza] |
21859 | God has no purpose, because God lacks nothing [Spinoza] |
4823 | God does not act according to the freedom of the will [Spinoza] |
17172 | God is a substance with infinite attributes [Spinoza] |
12928 | Spinoza's God is just power and necessity, without perfection or wisdom [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
7571 | Spinoza's God is not a person [Spinoza, by Jolley] |
4314 | God is wholly without passions, and strictly speaking does not love anyone [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
7609 | God is the sum and principle of all eternal laws [Spinoza, by Armstrong,K] |
19435 | God is not loveable for producing without choice and by necessity; God is loveable for his goodness [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
4825 | To say that God promotes what is good is false, as it sets up a goal beyond God [Spinoza] |
21856 | Spinoza says a substance of infinite attributes cannot fail to exist [Spinoza, by Lord] |
17178 | Denial of God is denial that his essence involves existence, which is absurd [Spinoza] |
21858 | God is being as such, and you cannot conceive of the non-existence of being [Spinoza, by Lord] |
4820 | God must necessarily exist, because no reason can be given for his non-existence [Spinoza] |
17169 | Some things makes me conceive of it as a thing whose essence requires its existence [Spinoza] |
22286 | Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter] |
8644 | Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege] |
4817 | If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence [Spinoza] |
4827 | Priests reject as heretics anyone who tries to understand miracles in a natural way [Spinoza] |
12757 | That God is the substance of all things is an ill-reputed doctrine [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
4829 | The human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God [Spinoza] |
17181 | God is the efficient cause of essences, as well as of existences [Spinoza] |
17180 | Everything is in God, and nothing exists or is thinkable without God [Spinoza] |
7836 | In Spinoza, one could substitute 'nature' or 'substance' for the word 'God' throughout [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
7831 | Spinoza's theory of mind implies that there is no immortality [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
21876 | After death, something eternal remains of the mind [Spinoza] |