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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Thought: a Logical Enquiry' and 'Logical Necessity'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
7740 There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
19466 The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
19465 There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
19468 The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
12204 The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
12195 Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt]
12199 There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt]
12201 We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
12194 Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
12198 Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
19470 Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
19471 A fact is a thought that is true [Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
9877 Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14532 A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12193 Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
12200 A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
12202 Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12203 If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
19469 We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege]
8162 Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett]
9818 A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
16379 Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
19467 A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
19472 A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
13304 Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
20820 Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]