30 ideas
| 18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
| 18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
| 18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
| 18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
| 18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
| 18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
| 18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
| 18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
| 18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
| 18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
| 18951 | For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam] |
| 18953 | Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam] |
| 18949 | The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam] |
| 18952 | '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam] |
| 18958 | In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam] |
| 18954 | Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam] |
| 18956 | Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam] |
| 18962 | Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam] |
| 18961 | We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam] |
| 18955 | Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam] |
| 18959 | Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
| 18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
| 18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
| 18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
| 18957 | Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam] |
| 18950 | Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam] |
| 18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
| 18960 | Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam] |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |