Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Nature of Existence vol.2' and 'Rationality in Action'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

46 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
3811 Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle]
3822 Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3806 Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle]
3812 Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
3809 If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
3810 In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15200 How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
14761 Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
3841 Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
3816 Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle]
3833 A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle]
3837 We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
3828 Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
3831 Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3830 In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3832 Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
3823 Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
3821 Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle]
3824 A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle]
3834 An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
3825 Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
3829 Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle]
3826 A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
3827 The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
3820 The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
3817 Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]
3808 Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
3818 We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
3814 Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
3840 We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
3815 The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle]
3839 Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
3835 If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle]
3836 If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
3838 Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3813 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
13304 Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
2608 For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
20820 Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
22936 A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
4231 Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
8591 There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
22935 The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
7802 A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle]
4230 A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe]
15199 The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]