68 ideas
2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
22355 | In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B] |
2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
4244 | It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B] |
4243 | Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B] |
2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
4114 | Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B] |
4128 | Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B] |
4132 | The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B] |
4134 | The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B] |
4135 | Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B] |
4120 | It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B] |
4252 | Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B] |
4116 | A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B] |
4112 | A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B] |
4113 | 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B] |
4250 | The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B] |
4110 | Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B] |
4248 | Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B] |
4249 | "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B] |
4121 | Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B] |
4122 | If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B] |
4124 | Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B] |
4245 | Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B] |
4246 | Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B] |
4247 | It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
4131 | Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B] |
4133 | Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |