Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Deflating Existential Consequence' and 'Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni]
We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni]