Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'What Required for Foundation for Maths?' and 'The Tragedy of Reason'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


49 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik]
In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik]
The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik]
Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik]
Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik]
Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik]
Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions make our intuitions mathematically useful [Mayberry]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Proof shows that it is true, but also why it must be true [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Set theory can't be axiomatic, because it is needed to express the very notion of axiomatisation [Mayberry]
There is a semi-categorical axiomatisation of set-theory [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
The misnamed Axiom of Infinity says the natural numbers are finite in size [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The set hierarchy doesn't rely on the dubious notion of 'generating' them [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of size is part of the very conception of a set [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
The mainstream of modern logic sees it as a branch of mathematics [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic only has its main theorems because it is so weak [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Only second-order logic can capture mathematical structure up to isomorphism [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Big logic has one fixed domain, but standard logic has a domain for each interpretation [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
No Löwenheim-Skolem logic can axiomatise real analysis [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
'Classificatory' axioms aim at revealing similarity in morphology of structures [Mayberry]
Axiomatiation relies on isomorphic structures being essentially the same [Mayberry]
'Eliminatory' axioms get rid of traditional ideal and abstract objects [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
No logic which can axiomatise arithmetic can be compact or complete [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers can be eliminated, by axiom systems for complete ordered fields [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / b. Quantity
Greek quantities were concrete, and ratio and proportion were their science [Mayberry]
Real numbers were invented, as objects, to simplify and generalise 'quantity' [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Cantor's infinite is an absolute, of all the sets or all the ordinal numbers [Mayberry]
Cantor extended the finite (rather than 'taming the infinite') [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
If proof and definition are central, then mathematics needs and possesses foundations [Mayberry]
The ultimate principles and concepts of mathematics are presumed, or grasped directly [Mayberry]
Foundations need concepts, definition rules, premises, and proof rules [Mayberry]
Axiom theories can't give foundations for mathematics - that's using axioms to explain axioms [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
1st-order PA is only interesting because of results which use 2nd-order PA [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
It is only 2nd-order isomorphism which suggested first-order PA completeness [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set theory is not just first-order ZF, because that is inadequate for mathematics [Mayberry]
We don't translate mathematics into set theory, because it comes embodied in that way [Mayberry]
Set theory is not just another axiomatised part of mathematics [Mayberry]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Real numbers as abstracted objects are now treated as complete ordered fields [Mayberry]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik]
Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]