47 ideas
| 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
| 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
| 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
| 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
| 13030 | Extensionality: ∀x ∀y (∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y) [Kunen] |
| 13032 | Pairing: ∀x ∀y ∃z (x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ z) [Kunen] |
| 13033 | Union: ∀F ∃A ∀Y ∀x (x ∈ Y ∧ Y ∈ F → x ∈ A) [Kunen] |
| 13037 | Infinity: ∃x (0 ∈ x ∧ ∀y ∈ x (S(y) ∈ x) [Kunen] |
| 13038 | Power Set: ∀x ∃y ∀z(z ⊂ x → z ∈ y) [Kunen] |
| 13034 | Replacement: ∀x∈A ∃!y φ(x,y) → ∃Y ∀X∈A ∃y∈Y φ(x,y) [Kunen] |
| 13039 | Foundation:∀x(∃y(y∈x) → ∃y(y∈x ∧ ¬∃z(z∈x ∧ z∈y))) [Kunen] |
| 13036 | Choice: ∀A ∃R (R well-orders A) [Kunen] |
| 13029 | Set Existence: ∃x (x = x) [Kunen] |
| 13031 | Comprehension: ∃y ∀x (x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ z ∧ φ) [Kunen] |
| 13040 | Constructibility: V = L (all sets are constructible) [Kunen] |
| 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
| 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
| 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
| 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
| 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
| 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
| 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
| 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
| 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
| 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
| 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
| 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
| 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
| 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
| 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
| 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
| 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
| 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
| 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
| 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
| 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |