19 ideas
12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
17867 | If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog] |
17877 | The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog] |
17872 | Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog] |
17871 | Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog] |
17866 | Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog] |
17868 | Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog] |
10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
17870 | Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog] |
17869 | Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog] |
17876 | Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog] |
10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
17873 | Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
17864 | Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog] |
17863 | Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |