Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Modality' and 'Epistemic Injustice'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M]
We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M]
Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M]
Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]