56 ideas
| 15801 | Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm] |
| 15802 | I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm] |
| 13258 | The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki] |
| 13288 | Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki] |
| 14506 | 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki] |
| 14505 | Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki] |
| 15832 | Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm] |
| 15829 | The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm] |
| 15809 | A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm] |
| 15828 | I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm] |
| 13289 | Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki] |
| 15827 | Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm] |
| 15830 | Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm] |
| 14501 | 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki] |
| 15804 | If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm] |
| 15810 | Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm] |
| 15805 | Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm] |
| 15807 | A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm] |
| 14495 | I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki] |
| 13264 | If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki] |
| 14497 | The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki] |
| 13280 | Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki] |
| 14496 | Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki] |
| 13279 | There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki] |
| 15814 | A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm] |
| 14498 | For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki] |
| 13283 | The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki] |
| 12852 | If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons] |
| 13266 | Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki] |
| 14500 | Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki] |
| 13281 | Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki] |
| 15808 | A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm] |
| 12851 | Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons] |
| 15806 | The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm] |
| 15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
| 15819 | Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm] |
| 15816 | 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm] |
| 15818 | So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm] |
| 15817 | If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm] |
| 15831 | Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm] |
| 15811 | I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm] |
| 15815 | Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm] |
| 15813 | People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm] |
| 15803 | Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm] |
| 15821 | Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm] |
| 15824 | There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm] |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| 15822 | The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm] |
| 14504 | The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki] |
| 13285 | Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki] |
| 13287 | Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki] |
| 13284 | Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki] |
| 15823 | Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm] |
| 15820 | A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm] |
| 13286 | There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki] |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |