28 ideas
8092 | Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin] |
8081 | 'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin] |
8085 | Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin] |
8086 | Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin] |
8091 | Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin] |
8087 | Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin] |
8089 | Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin] |
8082 | Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin] |
8072 | Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin] |
8075 | Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin] |
8088 | People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin] |
4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
8073 | How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin] |
8076 | The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |