36 ideas
| 2098 | The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz] |
| 3646 | There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz] |
| 2104 | No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz] |
| 19385 | All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz] |
| 21346 | The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz] |
| 14703 | Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter] |
| 14714 | Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter] |
| 14704 | 2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter] |
| 14706 | Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter] |
| 14711 | Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter] |
| 14717 | Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter] |
| 14720 | Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter] |
| 14695 | Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter] |
| 14696 | Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter] |
| 14697 | 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter] |
| 14698 | Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter] |
| 14699 | Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter] |
| 14709 | Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter] |
| 14719 | In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter] |
| 14701 | Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter] |
| 14702 | If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter] |
| 14705 | Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter] |
| 14715 | 2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter] |
| 14716 | 2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter] |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| 2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
| 2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
| 2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
| 20965 | Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
| 2103 | The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz] |
| 2100 | Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz] |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| 2107 | No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz] |
| 2101 | If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz] |
| 22894 | If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon] |
| 2099 | The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz] |