50 ideas
8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
9672 | Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G] |
9697 | X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G] |
9685 | <a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G] |
9675 | a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G] |
9674 | {x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G] |
9673 | {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G] |
9677 | Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G] |
9676 | {a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G] |
9679 | X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
9678 | X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
9681 | X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G] |
9683 | X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G] |
9682 | X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G] |
9684 | Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G] |
9688 | A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G] |
9689 | The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G] |
9690 | A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G] |
9691 | A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G] |
9694 | The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G] |
9693 | The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G] |
9692 | The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G] |
9698 | The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G] |
9695 | An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G] |
9696 | A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G] |
9686 | A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G] |
9687 | A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G] |
9680 | The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G] |
8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |