76 ideas
13466 | We are all post-Kantians, because he set the current agenda for philosophy [Hart,WD] |
13477 | The problems are the monuments of philosophy [Hart,WD] |
13515 | To study abstract problems, some knowledge of set theory is essential [Hart,WD] |
13469 | Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD] |
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
13504 | Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD] |
13503 | A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD] |
13500 | Conditional Proof: infer a conditional, if the consequent can be deduced from the antecedent [Hart,WD] |
13502 | ∃y... is read as 'There exists an individual, call it y, such that...', and not 'There exists a y such that...' [Hart,WD] |
13456 | Set theory articulates the concept of order (through relations) [Hart,WD] |
13497 | Nowadays ZFC and NBG are the set theories; types are dead, and NF is only useful for the whole universe [Hart,WD] |
13443 | ∈ relates across layers, while ⊆ relates within layers [Hart,WD] |
13442 | Without the empty set we could not form a∩b without checking that a and b meet [Hart,WD] |
13493 | In the modern view, foundation is the heart of the way to do set theory [Hart,WD] |
13495 | Foundation Axiom: an nonempty set has a member disjoint from it [Hart,WD] |
13461 | We can choose from finite and evident sets, but not from infinite opaque ones [Hart,WD] |
13462 | With the Axiom of Choice every set can be well-ordered [Hart,WD] |
13516 | If we accept that V=L, it seems to settle all the open questions of set theory [Hart,WD] |
13441 | Naïve set theory has trouble with comprehension, the claim that every predicate has an extension [Hart,WD] |
13494 | The iterative conception may not be necessary, and may have fixed points or infinitely descending chains [Hart,WD] |
13457 | A 'partial ordering' is irreflexive and transitive; the sets are ordered, but not the subsets [Hart,WD] |
13458 | A partial ordering becomes 'total' if any two members of its field are comparable [Hart,WD] |
13490 | Von Neumann defines α<β as α∈β [Hart,WD] |
13460 | 'Well-ordering' must have a least member, so it does the natural numbers but not the integers [Hart,WD] |
13481 | Maybe sets should be rethought in terms of the even more basic categories [Hart,WD] |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
13506 | The universal quantifier can't really mean 'all', because there is no universal set [Hart,WD] |
13513 | Models are ways the world might be from a first-order point of view [Hart,WD] |
13505 | Model theory studies how set theory can model sets of sentences [Hart,WD] |
13511 | Model theory is mostly confined to first-order theories [Hart,WD] |
13512 | Modern model theory begins with the proof of Los's Conjecture in 1962 [Hart,WD] |
13496 | First-order logic is 'compact': consequences of a set are consequences of a finite subset [Hart,WD] |
13484 | Berry's Paradox: we succeed in referring to a number, with a term which says we can't do that [Hart,WD] |
13482 | The Burali-Forti paradox is a crisis for Cantor's ordinals [Hart,WD] |
13507 | The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar [Hart,WD] |
13459 | The less-than relation < well-orders, and partially orders, and totally orders the ordinal numbers [Hart,WD] |
13463 | There are at least as many infinite cardinals as transfinite ordinals (because they will map) [Hart,WD] |
13491 | The axiom of infinity with separation gives a least limit ordinal ω [Hart,WD] |
13492 | Von Neumann's ordinals generalise into the transfinite better, because Zermelo's ω is a singleton [Hart,WD] |
13446 | 19th century arithmetization of analysis isolated the real numbers from geometry [Hart,WD] |
13509 | We can establish truths about infinite numbers by means of induction [Hart,WD] |
13474 | Euclid has a unique parallel, spherical geometry has none, and saddle geometry has several [Hart,WD] |
13471 | Mathematics makes existence claims, but philosophers usually say those are never analytic [Hart,WD] |
13488 | Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD] |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
13480 | Fregean self-evidence is an intrinsic property of basic truths, rules and definitions [Hart,WD] |
13476 | The failure of key assumptions in geometry, mereology and set theory throw doubt on the a priori [Hart,WD] |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
13475 | The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD] |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |