37 ideas
| 14684 | A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N] |
| 14669 | For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14692 | System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N] |
| 14667 | System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14668 | In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N] |
| 14671 | What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N] |
| 14686 | S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N] |
| 14691 | S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14693 | The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N] |
| 14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
| 8915 | How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen] |
| 14678 | Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N] |
| 14680 | Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N] |
| 14685 | Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| 14690 | In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N] |
| 14688 | Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14677 | Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N] |
| 14679 | Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| 14681 | Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14676 | Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N] |
| 14689 | Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N] |
| 14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
| 14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
| 14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
| 14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
| 8917 | The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen] |
| 8912 | Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen] |
| 8913 | Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen] |
| 8914 | Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen] |
| 8916 | Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen] |
| 8918 | Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen] |
| 8919 | Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen] |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |