60 ideas
14179 | The finest branch of wisdom is justice and moderation in ordering states and families [Plato] |
16227 | Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley] |
16216 | Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley] |
16211 | A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley] |
16219 | Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley] |
16223 | Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley] |
16226 | Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley] |
16208 | Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley] |
16221 | Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley] |
16230 | Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley] |
1607 | Diotima said the Forms are the objects of desire in philosophical discourse [Plato, by Roochnik] |
16232 | An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley] |
16200 | Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley] |
16237 | The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley] |
16238 | Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley] |
16220 | Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley] |
16222 | Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley] |
16228 | The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley] |
16229 | Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley] |
14492 | If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley] |
16193 | 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley] |
16195 | Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley] |
16202 | The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley] |
16192 | Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley] |
16196 | Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley] |
16197 | How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley] |
16191 | Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley] |
16199 | If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley] |
16201 | Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley] |
16240 | If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley] |
16203 | Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley] |
16204 | Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley] |
16212 | An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley] |
16213 | Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley] |
16206 | Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley] |
16205 | The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley] |
16225 | If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley] |
16239 | To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley] |
174 | True opinion without reason is midway between wisdom and ignorance [Plato] |
16218 | On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley] |
180 | We call a person the same throughout life, but all their attributes change [Plato] |
181 | Only the gods stay unchanged; we replace our losses with similar acquisitions [Plato] |
4026 | Beauty is harmony with what is divine, and ugliness is lack of such harmony [Plato] |
172 | Love of ugliness is impossible [Plato] |
173 | Beauty and goodness are the same [Plato] |
183 | Stage two is the realisation that beauty of soul is of more value than beauty of body [Plato] |
184 | Progress goes from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, and reaches absolute beauty [Plato] |
171 | Music is a knowledge of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm [Plato] |
176 | Love follows beauty, wisdom is exceptionally beautiful, so love follows wisdom [Plato] |
14177 | Love assists men in achieving merit and happiness [Plato] |
179 | Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good [Plato] |
177 | If a person is good they will automatically become happy [Plato] |
14178 | Happiness is secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful [Plato] |
170 | The only slavery which is not dishonourable is slavery to excellence [Plato] |
182 | The first step on the right path is the contemplation of physical beauty when young [Plato] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
16215 | Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
16207 | Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley] |
175 | Gods are not lovers of wisdom, because they are already wise [Plato] |