17 ideas
14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |