15 ideas
15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |
15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |