53 ideas
| 6928 | Only that which can be an object of religion is an object of philosophy [Feuerbach] |
| 16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
| 6918 | Philosophy should not focus on names, but on the determined nature of things [Feuerbach] |
| 6904 | Modern philosophy begins with Descartes' abstraction from sensation and matter [Feuerbach] |
| 6931 | Empiricism is right about ideas, but forgets man himself as one of our objects [Feuerbach] |
| 6933 | The laws of reality are also the laws of thought [Feuerbach] |
| 16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
| 16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
| 16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
| 16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
| 16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
| 16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
| 6919 | Absolute thought remains in another world from being [Feuerbach] |
| 19457 | Being is what is undetermined, and hence indistinguishable [Feuerbach] |
| 6920 | Being posits essence, and my essence is my being [Feuerbach] |
| 6921 | Particularity belongs to being, whereas generality belongs to thought [Feuerbach] |
| 6926 | The only true being is of the senses, perception, feeling and love [Feuerbach] |
| 16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
| 16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
| 16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
| 16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
| 16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
| 16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
| 16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
| 16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
| 16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 6908 | Consciousness is absolute reality, and everything exists through consciousness [Feuerbach] |
| 6932 | Ideas arise through communication, and reason is reached through community [Feuerbach] |
| 6935 | In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts [Feuerbach] |
| 16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
| 6925 | The new philosophy thinks of the concrete in a concrete (not a abstract) manner [Feuerbach] |
| 16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
| 16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
| 16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
| 16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 6924 | Plotinus was ashamed to have a body [Feuerbach] |
| 6927 | If you love nothing, it doesn't matter whether something exists or not [Feuerbach] |
| 6934 | Man is not a particular being, like animals, but a universal being [Feuerbach] |
| 6936 | The essence of man is in community, but with distinct individuals [Feuerbach] |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| 6913 | God's existence cannot be separated from essence and concept, which can only be thought as existing [Feuerbach] |
| 6903 | If God is only an object for man, then only the essence of man is revealed in God [Feuerbach] |
| 6923 | God is what man would like to be [Feuerbach] |
| 6911 | God is for us a mere empty idea, which we fill with our own ego and essence [Feuerbach] |
| 6902 | Catholicism concerns God in himself, Protestantism what God is for man [Feuerbach] |
| 6905 | Absolute idealism is the realized divine mind of Leibnizian theism [Feuerbach] |