Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Walking the Tightrope of Reason' and 'Properties'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin]
A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong]
There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin]
Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]
The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]